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A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
-United States Constitution, Amendment II

A fierce debate about the Second Amendment has been percolat
ing in academia for two decades, and has now bubbled through to the
courts. The question at the heart of this debate is whether the
Amendment restricts the government's ability to regulate the private
possession of firearms. Since at least 1939 - when the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Miller,1 its only decision squarely addressing
the scope of the right to "keep and bear Arms" - the answer to that
question has been an unqualified "no." Courts have brushed aside
Second Amendment challenges to gun control legislation, reading the
Amendment to forbid only laws that interfere with states' militias.2
1 . 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
2. Courts have upheld federal laws regulating the private possession of short-barreled
shotguns, see Miller, 307 U.S. at 174, machine guns, see, e.g. , United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d
273 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016
(8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976), and assault weapons,
see San Diego Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1996). They have also up
held laws prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons, see, e.g. , United States v. Johnson,
497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971); Cases v.
United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), by persons convicted of domestic violence of
fenses, see, e.g. , Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3µ 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
and by persons subject to restraining orders, see, e.g. , United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211
(6th Cir. 1 999); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Spruill, 61 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 1999). But see United States v. Emerson, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (striking down federal statute prohibiting the possession of
firearms persons subject to restraining orders). Courts have also upheld extensive federal
regulation of firearms dealers, see United States v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1971); cf.
Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972) (upholding requirement that gun purchas
ers accurately answer certain questions prior to purchase).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never held that the Second Amendment is "incorpo
rated" in the Fourteenth Amendment's protections. Accordingly, courts have uniformly re
jected Second Amendment challenges to state or local firearms regulations, see, e.g., Peoples
Rights Org. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 1998); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d
120 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995); Thomas v. City Council of Portland,
730 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1984); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). The Supreme Court last addressed the question in 1886,
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Recently, however, that judicial orthodoxy has come under attack
from a group of revisionist scholars.3 Rather than protecting only the
states' militia, the revisionists have argued, the Amendment "protects
an individual right inherent in the concept of ordered liberty."4
holding that the Amendment does not apply to states - but of course this holding predates
modern incorporation jurisprudence. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); cf infra Sec
tion IV.A.1 .
3. This literature has now become quite large. For representative examples, see
P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE
ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Randy Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under
Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1 141 (1996);
Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 59 (1989); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MICH . L. REV. 204 (1983) [hereinafter Kates, Jr., Original Meaning];
Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143
(1986); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989);
Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA . L. REV. 1
(1996); L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM . & MARY L.
REV. 1311 (1997); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62
TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal
Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second
Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998). For a complete bibliography, see David B.
Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has
Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 101 n.9 (1999).
There is also a substantial body of work by both legal scholars and historians disputing
the revisionists. The legal scholarship includes: Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1365 (1993) [hereinafter Bogus, Race, Riots and Guns]; Carl T. Bogus, The
Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1998) [hereinafter
Bogus, Hidden History]; Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in
the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5
(1989); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
107 (1991); Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction
of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995); John Dwight Ingram & Allison Ann
Ray, The Right(?) to Keep and Bear Arms, 27 N.M.L. REV. 491 (1997); H. Richard Uviller &
William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: The Case ofthe Vanishing Predicate,
76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 403 (2000); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen
Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991) [hereinafter Williams,
The Terrifying Second Amendment]; David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second
Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV . 879 (1996) (here
inafter Williams, Conjuring with the People]; David C. Williams, The Unitary Second
Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 822 (1998). The historians' work includes: Michael
Bellesiles, The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States 1760-1865, 83 J. AM . HIST. 425
(Sept. 1996) [hereinafter Bellesiles, Gun Culture]; Michael Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early
America: The Regulation Of Firearms Ownership 1607-1794, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 567
(1998) [hereinafter Bellesiles, Gun Laws]; Michael Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of
the Second Amendment, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 247 (1999) (hereinafter Bellesiles, Suicide
Pact]; Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST.
COMMENTARY 221 (1999); Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and
Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. H I ST. 22 (1984); Don Higginbotham, The Sec
ond Amendment in Historical Context, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 263 (1999).
STEPHEN

4. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. at 600 (summarizing views of revisionist scholars). I distinguish
below between two versions of the revisionist claim: a libertarian version expressed in this
quotation, and an alternate, also far-reaching version that pictures the American citizenry as
an "unorganized militia." See infra Sections 11.B and 11.C.
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The revisionist position emerged in the 1980s and has won growing
acceptance among constitutional scholars.5 The breakthrough moment
came in 1989, when Sanford Levinson published his article The Em
barrassing Second A mendment in the Yale Law Journal.6 Levinson
largely accepted the revisionists' historical account of the Second
Amendment, and he suggested that the Amendment limits legislators'
ability to regulate guns to a much greater extent than judges and
scholars had theretofore acknowledged.
Levinson's article brought the revisionist project a new level of at
tention and legitimacy.7 Since its publication, the number of revisionist
articles has grown substantially, casebooks have begun to recognize
the revisionist position,8 and other leading constitutional law scholars
have joined Levinson in accepting, at least partially, the revisionist ar
gument.9 In particular, Akhil Amar's recent tour-de-force The Bill of
Rights includes a thorough and powerful argument in support of the
revisionist position.10
5. Note, however, that acceptance of the revisionist argument has for the most part been
limited to legal scholars. For the most part, historians have rejected the revisionists' claims.
See sources cited supra note 3. The impact of this work, in fact, has led to a partial recanta
tion by leading revisionist historian Robert E. Shalhope. Compare Robert E. Shalhope, The
Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982), with Robert E.
Shalhope, To Keep and Bear Arms in the Early Republic, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 269
(1999).
6. Levinson, supra note 3. I should note that while The Embarrassing Second Amend
ment has been widely read as endorsing revisionist theories, Levinson was careful to stop
short of concluding that the Second Amendment prohibits gun control legislation; he merely
suggested that the revisionist arguments deserved a more respectful hearing than he believed
they were getting. In a later essay, though, Levinson comes closer to stating outright that he
believes current doctrine to be mistaken. Sanford Levinson, Is the Second Amendment Fi
nally Becoming Recognized as Part of the Constitution? Voices from the Courts, 1998 BYU L.
REV. 127.
7. Writing in 1989, Levinson noted that "no one recognized by the legal academy as a
'major' writer on constitutional law has deigned to turn his or her talents to a full considera
tion of the Amendment," Levinson, supra, note 3, at 639 n.13, and that " [o]ne will search the
leading casebooks in vain for any mention of the Second Amendment," id. at 639 n.14.
Those assertions are now obsolete.
8. See, e.g., PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN & AKHIL REED AMAR,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING 410-13 (4th ed. 2000); DANIEL A.
FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 416-18 (2nd ed. 1998); GEOFFREY R.

STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 287 (1998 Supplement). Many leading casebooks, however, continue to omit any dis
cussion of the Second Amendment. See, e.g. , DAAN BRAVEMAN, WILLIAM C. BANKS &
RODNEY A. S MOLLA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL
SYSTEM (4th ed. 2000); GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (13th ed. 1997); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed.
2000).

9. See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 46-59,
257-66 (1998); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894-903 (3d ed.
2000 ).
10. See AMAR, supra note 9, at 46-59, 257-66.
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Most important, revisionist work has begun to influence the judici
ary. In his concurring opinion in the 1997 case Printz v. United States,
Justice Thomas (writing only for himself) proposed a reexamination of
the Second Amendment. Thomas suggested that the Amendment cre
ates a "personal right to 'keep and bear arms,' " and he hinted that this
right would preclude aggressive gun control regulations.11
Just last year, a District Court in Texas followed up on Thomas'
suggestion by striking down a federal statute banning persons subject
to certain types of restraining orders from possessing firearms.12 The
decision, United States v. Emerson, was only the second in the nation's
history in which a federal court used the Amendment to invalidate a
gun control law (the first was the District Court decision in Miller
which the Supreme Court subsequently reversed in 193913). Both Jus
tice Thomas' Printz opinion and the Emerson Court relied heavily on
revisionist scholarship.
The Second Amendment debate sparked by the revisionists has at
tracted considerable attention in the press,14 presumably because of its
possible impact on public policy. If the revisionists are successful in
changing doctrine, courts may well narrow the parameters of permis
sible gun control initiatives. But paving the way for such initiatives is
not my concern here.15 The real stakes in the Second Amendment de
bate are not practical, but theoretical.
In his pathbreaking article, Professor Levinson wrote that the Sec
ond Amendment is "profoundly embarrassing" to many students of
the Constitution. I agree with that characterization, but I disagree with
Levinson about the source of the embarrassment. For Levinson, the
11. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (em
phasis in original). Justice Scalia has expressed similar views in a speech. See Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in In
terpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 43 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("We may like the . . . elimination of
the right to bear arms; but Jet us not pretend that these are not reductions of rights.").
12. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 598. Other federal courts, however, have upheld the stat
ute. See, e.g., Baker, 197 F.3d at 211; Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 693; Spruill, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
13. United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Ark.), rev'd 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
14. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Dueling Scholars Join Fray Over a Constitutional
Challenge to Gun Control Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at A26; David E. Rovella, Cir
cuit Sights Gun Rights, NAT. L. J., June 5, 2000, at 1; Richard B. Schmitt, The 2nd Amend
ment: It's a Constant - and Confusing- Refrain, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1999, at Al; Richard
Willing, Texas Case Could Shape the Future of Gun Control, USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1999, at
lA.
15. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I do believe stronger regulation of fire
arms would be sound public policy. I make this unusual (for a Jaw review article) comment
only because it is common for participants in the scholarly debate over the Second Amend
ment to suggest that other participants' views on the Amendment are determined by their
views on the wisdom of firearms regulations. As I hope will be clear from my arguments in
this Article, however, I believe that one's judgment as to the constitutionality of a given
public policy ought to be independent of one's views as to the soundness of that policy.
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Amendment calls into question scholars' commitment to result
indifferent interpretive methodology. He noted that the Amendment
had (at the time he was writing) been entirely ignored by mainstream
constitutional scholars, and he attributed this neglect to a "perhaps
subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even 'winning,'
interpretations of the Second Amendment would present real hurdles
to those of us supporting prohibitory regulation."16
The real source of the embarrassment goes deeper. The Amend
ment is troublesome because it evokes scholars' latent confusion about
the sources and mechanisms of doctrinal change in constitutional law.
In particular, the Second Amendment, like no other constitutional
provision, puts to the test one's commitment to original intent as a
source of constitutional meaning.
Most contemporary scholars, whether they call themselves "origi
nalists" or not, believe that constitutional meaning should be derived,
at least in part, from the understandings of those who framed and rati
fied the constitutional text (or perhaps of the citizens whom those
framers and ratifiers represented).17 The revisionists' argument, which
is straightforwardly originalist, poses an uncomfortable challenge to
that belief. Their argument, in sum, is this: The framers of the Second
Amendment intended for every American citizen to have the right to
own guns, free from interference by the federal government; modern
courts have approved federal gun control laws that the Founders
would certainly have seen as violating the Amendment; accordingly,
modern doctrine is illegitimate.
As I will explain below, the revisionists' account of the Founders'
understanding of the Second Amendment is substantially accurate,18
and so is their claim that modern doctrine departs from that under
standing. Even if one does not accept the full sweep of the revisionists'
historical claims, it is impossible to deny that the Founders intended
the Second Amendment to constrain federal regulation of firearms to
at least some degree. Modern doctrine reduces the Amendment to a
virtual nullity.
I suspect that many scholars - certainly after Levinson's article
and Amar's book - accept the revisionists' claim of a conflict be
tween original intent and modern doctrine. Yet at the same time,
many scholars must also find the Founders' vision hopelessly anachro-

16. Levinson, supra note 3, at 642.
17. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonorginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613
(1999) (suggesting that "Originalism is now the prevailing approach to constitutional inter
pretation").
18. Or at least one version of the revisionists' historical account is accurate. I will distin
guish below between two different versions of the revisionist argument - what I call the
Libertarian Approach and the Unorganized Militia Approach - and argue that the latter is
supported by the historical record, while the former is not. See infra Sections 11.B and 11.C.
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mstlc, and modern doctrine intuitively correct - and not just, as
Levinson suggests, because they fear the policy consequences of the
revisionists' argument.
After all, so much has changed since 1791. The Founders lived in a
time when the threat of interstate warfare, or of the federal govern
ment using force to subdue dissident states, was real - so real that it
actually happened, although not for seventy years. The possibility of
armed resistance to government force was also quite real, as demon
strated by Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts shortly before the Con
stitution was written, and by the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania
shortly after - not to mention the great triumph over England. Fur
ther, widespread and uncontrolled gun ownership poses threats to
public safety today undreamed of in 1791.19
The problem comes when it is time to put this changed
circumstances argument into doctrinal form. The Second Amendment
has not been repealed; the authoritative text remains today what it
was in 1791. Contemporary constitutional theory simply has no widely
accepted methodology for understanding how the meaning of un
amended constitutional text can change over time20• As Laurence
Tribe puts it in the latest edition of his treatise, changed circumstances
do not mean "that the Second Amendment may properly be deemed
wholly irrelevant today or that it may plausibly be construed to do no
more than protect state defense forces against outright abolition by
Congress. Although the factual predicates assumed by the framers of
the Second Amendment no longer obtain, the same could be said with
respect to other constitutional provisions."21 Thus the Second
Amendment is an embarrassment for Levinson and Tribe in the same
way Brown v. Board of Education was an embarrassment for Herbert
19. According to the most recent FBI statistics, firearms are used in sixty-five percent of
murders and thirty-eight percent of robberies in the United States. See FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1999) at 18, 29.
There is considerable debate among government officials, scholars and the public as to
whether the overall level of gun ownership in the United States has any causal relationship
to the incidence or lethality of crime, and if so whether gun control statutes can affect this
relationship. Compare, e.g. , FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT
THE PROBLEM 122-23 (1997) ("Current evidence suggests that a combination of the ready
availability of guns and the willingness to use maximum force in interpersonal conflict is the
most important single contribution to the high U.S. death rate from violence.") and Mark
Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper
7967 (October 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7967 (arguing that increases
in gun ownership result in increases in homicides), with JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS,
LESS CRIME (1998) (arguing that regulatory regimes encouraging private gun ownership re
duce the incidence of crime victimization).
20. A recent symposium issue of the Yale Law Journal contains several fascinating and
provocative reflections on the difficulty of accounting for change in constitutional doctrine.
See Symposium, Moments of Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism, 108
YALE L.J. 1917 (1999).
21. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 900.
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Wechsler,22 and Roe v. Wade is an embarrassment for many scholars
today - the substance of contemporary doctrine seems impossible to
square with the intentions of the framers of the relevant constitutional
text.
But it is possible to accept both the revisionists' historical claims
and the modern militia-focused jurisprudence - without embarrass
ment. To do so, we have to understand the Second Amendment in its
textual and temporal context. The first step is to broaden the inquiry
beyond the Amendment itself; instead of the revisionists' "clause
bound"23 approach, we must appreciate how the Amendment is linked
to other constitutional provisions dealing with military structure. The
Amendment must be read in conjunction with those provisions to cre
ate a coherent whole.
Next, we must broaden the inquiry beyond the years 1787 to 1791.
This step follows directly from the first; once we are committed to
reading the Second Amendment in harmony with the remainder of the
Constitution, we must recognize that changes in that remainder may
affect our reading of the Second Amendment, if we are to maintain
the harmony. And while the text of the Second Amendment has of
course remained the same since its ratification, the Constitution that
surrounds it has been dramatically amended - most obviously by the
Fourteenth Amendment. In other doctrinal areas, we recognize that
the insertion into the Constitution of the Fourteenth Amendment has
forced courts to reinterpret elements of the preexisting document.24 I
will argue below for a similar reinterpretation of the "right to keep
and bear Arms."
These two steps, I believe, will yield a fuller and more satisfying
account of the Second Amendment than either the revisionists or the
judicial opinions they attack, while still vindicating the doctrinal con
clusions that have been settled since Miller. Only by recognizing that
22. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 31-35 (1959).
23. The phrase is Professor Ely's (although he used it, of course, to characterize a gen
eral tendency among constitutional scholars, and not with reference to the Second Amend
ment debate). JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 12 (1980).
24. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), for example, the Supreme Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits racial discrimination by the fed
eral government - in effect, reading the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
into the Fifth Amendment. Another, perhaps less obvious, example is modern incorporation
doctrine, which holds not only that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the Bill of
Rights, but also that the incorporated amendments should be applied identically against the
states and the federal government. See, e.g. , Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The result is
that doctrinal developments in criminal procedure jurisprudence that are motivated primar
ily by concerns about state practices wind up constraining the federal government as well.
Cf AMAR, supra note 9, at 257-83 (describing how the content of rights granted under the
Bill of Rights has been "refined" by the Supreme Court as a result of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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the Second Amendment draws meaning from the Constitution of
which it is a part, and that that Constitution has changed over time,
can we understand and justify the changes in Second Amendment ju
risprudence that Professors Levinson and Tribe find so troubling.
Thus my core purpose in this Article is to demonstrate the power of an
interpretive methodology that is not only originalist,25 but also holistic
and historical.26

25. This Article is written from an originalist perspective; it presupposes that constitu
tional meaning should be drawn largely from the understandings of those who wrote and
ratified the Constitution, and of the citizens those writers and ratifiers represented. I hope,
however, that it will be useful even to those who reject this perspective, by showing that
originalism need not bind us to constitutional meanings established 210 years ago. For
twenty-first century constitutional interpreters, the relevant writers, ratifiers and citizens in
clude not only the 1790s Founders, but certainly also the 1860s Reconstruction Republicans,
and perhaps the 1930s New Dealers as well. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 105-58 (1991) (describing the New Deal as an episode of "higher lawmaking"
that changed the Constitution) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] ; Bruce Ackerman,
We the People: Transformations 255-382 (1998) (same) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS] .
26. I do not claim that this method is original to me in any way. Rather, holistic interpre
tation - defined by Charles Black as "the method of inference from the structures and rela
tionships created by the constitution in all its parts," CHARLES L BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE
AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (reprint ed. 1985) - is well-established
among constitutional scholars. Many scholars also precede me in seeking to integrate his
torical change into Black's model, prominent examples being Bruce Ackerman, see
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25; ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note
25, and Akhil Amar, see AMAR, supra note 9. Indeed, readers who are familiar with the
work of Ackerman and Amar will immediately recognize this Article as an attempt to build
on that work.
I do believe, however, that while holism and historicism are in theory standard operating
procedures, in practice much constitutional interpretation is clause-bound and ahistorical.
The Second Amendment revisionists are particularly salient examples, but the roots of these
problematic tendencies reach deeply into mainstream scholarship. Consider, for example,
efforts to understand constitutional interpretation as an act of "translation." See Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity as Translation: Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997)
[hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity as Translation]; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71
TEXAS L. REV. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation]; Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995) [here
inafter Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings]; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradi
tion of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig's Theory of Translation, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1435 (1997); Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural
Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161 (1998); Abner S. Greene, Discounting Account
ability, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1489 (1997); Sanford Levinson, Translation: Who Needs It?, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1457 (1997); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Third Translation of the Com
merce Clause: Congressional Power to Regulate Social Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1206 (1998); Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1241 (1998). While the metaphor of interpretation-as-translation offers valuable in
sights, it also encourages an interpretive practice that overemphasizes specific pockets of
text and leaps from ratification to the present with insufficient regard for the texture of in
tervening developments. I consider, and reject, the view that modern Second Amendment
doctrine is an acceptable "translation" of the Amendment's original meaning infra at Section
11.D. More broadly, my hope is to persuade judges and other scholars not only that my ac
count of the Second Amendment is better than that of the revisionists, but that commitment
to a genuinely holistic and historicized practice will yield more satisfying results than com
peting methods offer.
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Part I of the Article engages the revisionists squarely on the turf
they have staked out: the intent of those who framed and ratified the
Second Amendment. Here I credit the revisionists with some impor
tant insights. Their research reminds us how greatly the world in which
the Second Amendment was adopted differed from our own. This per
spective helps us understand how the Founders could have placed the
right to bear arms on par with the right to free speech - a decision
that baffles many modern Americans.27 Yet while the revisionists cor
rectly perceive that the right to keep and bear arms was crucial to the
Founders, they misunderstand precisely why the right was so impor
tant. I will argue that the Founders' overriding concern was to ensure
that the new nation's military force would be composed of state mili
tias instead of, or at least in addition to, a federal standing army. To
the Founders, a standing army posed a threat of both tyranny and ru
inous military adventurism. To counter this threat, the Constitution
meticulously allocated military power between the federal army and
the state militias. The purpose of the Second Amendment was to pro
tect this allocation.
Part II is analytic. My goal is to clarify the debate by identifying
the argument at the core of the revisionists' attack on the courts. First,
in light of the history recounted in Part I, I hope to discredit a liber
tarian version of the revisionist approach, which sees activities like
hunting and recreational shooting as interests protected by the Second
Amendment. This position, while it may be widespread among lay
Second Amendment enthusiasts, cannot be supported by the historical
record. An alternate version of the revisionist argument, however, is
more plausible. According to this theory, the Amendment protects the
rights of individual Americans to arm themselves so they can serve as
the "unorganized militia" of the several states. This "Unorganized
Militia Approach" is a fair reading of the Founders' intent; were we
living in the early Nineteenth Century, it would provide the basis for
any judicial implementation of the Second Amendment.
Part II also considers the possibility that modern Second Amend
ment doctrine can be understood as what Lawrence Lessig calls a
"translation" of the Amendment's original meaning.28 While this un
derstanding is in some ways appealing, in the end I reject it. Contem
porary doctrine goes beyond a "translation" that applies the Founders'
principles to new and unforeseen facts; it is a repudiation of the prin
ciples themselves.
In Part III, I seek to explain this repudiation as a consequence of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Civil War destroyed the Founders'
27. Although, it may be needless to say, there are millions of Americans to whom this
equivalence makes perfect sense.
28. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 26; Lessig, Fidelity as Translation, su
pra note 26; Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 26.

598

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:588

carefully wrought design; by initiating a federal draft, Lincoln replaced
the Founders' decentralized military structure with a national army. I
will argue that the Fourteenth Amendment made Lincoln's innova
tions a permanent part of the constitutional framework. One of that
Amendment's many ramifications was to legitimize a federal military
draft, and concomitantly undermine the role of the states' militia.
With the militia rendered constitutionally obsolete, the purpose of the
Second Amendment evaporated.
In Part IV, I consider a new strand of the revisionist argument,
which understands the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment to be
precisely the opposite of what I am suggesting. This argument, made
most persuasively by Akhil Amar,29 claims that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to reaffirm and expand - "incorporate," in
modern parlance - the Bill of Rights. As the Second Amendment is
part of the Bill, Amar argues, we should understand the Fourteenth
Amendment to have strengthened, not weakened, its protections.
I will argue, however, that Amar's argument is seriously flawed be
cause it ignores the particular historical circumstances in which con
temporary incorporation doctrine developed. For Amar, incorpora
tion should be understood as simply putting into effect the intentions
of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the Supreme
Court formulated the incorporation doctrine only after the New Deal
rendered unusable earlier interpretations of the Fourteenth Amend
ment; accordingly, a full understanding of the Fourteenth Amend
ment's effect on the Bill of Rights - including the Second Amend
ment - must explain why the incorporation doctrine emerged only
after the New Deal, and not before.
I then provide a brief start toward such an explanation by con
trasting the rebirth of the First Amendment after the New Deal with
the dormancy of the Second. I conclude by suggesting the need for fur
ther work by courts and scholars to give the Second Amendment
meaning in the context of the post-New Deal Constitution.
I.

TH E F OUNDERS ' VISION OF THE S ECOND AMENDMENT

For the Founders, the Second Amendment was primarily about the
allocation of military power.30 The genesis of the Amendment lay in
29. See AMAR, supra note 9.
30. Throughout this Article, I will attribute various beliefs to "the Founders." The emi
nent historian Michael Bellesiles has pointed out to me that such language implies a unity of
ideology among the men who drafted and ratified the Constitution and the Bill of Rights not to mention the citizens who those men claimed to represent - that simply did not exist.
I certainly do not mean to obscure the endlessly fascinating diversity of views within this
group. See generally, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS (1999) (describing com
peting strands of political theory within the beliefs of both Federalists and Anti-Federalists).
I nonetheless think that reducing the historical complexity to simple statements of the form
"The Founders believed . . . " is not only justifiable shorthand, but is necessary for constitu-
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one of the most contentious issues faced by the Philadelphia Conven
tion: whether the national government should have an army or rely in
stead on state-based militia.3 1 Characteristically, the Founders reached
a complex and ingenious compromise in which both the federal army
and the states' militia were assigned carefully delineated roles. The
purpose of the Second Amendment was to protect that compromise.
A. The Roles of the A rmy and the Militia in the Founders'
Political Theory
The Founders' view of military power was built on a dichotomy be
tween armies and militias. In this ideology, the two institutions dif
fered along a range of social and political dimensions.32 First, armies
consisted of full-time, professional soldiers - "permanent corps in the
pay of the government."33 Militiamen, on the other hand, were citizen
soldiers, men who owned weapons, trained periodically and stood
ready to defend their1country if necessary. Second, armies were com
posed wholly of hirelings attracted by decent wages, or fortune
seekers in search of plunder. Militia service, by contrast, was a com
pulsory obligation of citizenship imposed across society, although men
were typically permitted to provide a substitute or pay a fee to avoid
service.34 Third, and crucially for the Founders' experiment in federal
ist democracy, armies served the highest level of government - the
Crown in England, or the national government in the soon-to-be
United States. Militias, on the other hand, were associated with local
political structures - the nobility in England, or the states here. Akhil
Amar succinctly summarizes the Founders' understanding: A militia
unit was "a randomly conscripted cross-section of the general militia
(all citizens capable of bearing arms) . . . serving alongside their famitional interpretation - at least for those who believe, as I do, that constitutional interpreta
tion must be constrained by what Justice Scalia has termed the " 'objectified' intent" of the
Constitution. See SCALIA, supra note 11, at 17.

31. No fewer than eight of the Federalist Papers are devoted in whole or in part to de
fending the Philadelphia Convention's decision to authorize Congress to "raise and support
Armies." See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 8, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 41, 46
(James Madison).
32. For good descriptions of the Founding-era military, see JOHN WHITECLA Y
CHAMBERS II, TO RAISE AN ARMY: THE DRAFT COMES TO MODERN AMERICA 13-30
(1987); JOHN K. MAHON, HISTORY OF THE MILmA AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 1-62
(1983); CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL
ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER, 1775-1783 (1979).
33.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

34. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 32, at 13-30; MAHON, supra note 32, at 1-62; Alan
Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56 U. CIN. L. REV.
919, 940 n.116 (1988) ("The Constitution recognized two military forces: the militia and the
regular army. Service in the militia was compulsory at the time of the Constitution, whereas
the regular army was to be raised by enlisting volunteers.").
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lies, friends, neighborhoods, classmates and fellow parishioners. "35
Army enlistees, "full-time soldiers who had sold themselves into vir
tual bondage to the government, were typically considered the dregs
of society - men without land, homes, families, or principles."36
Recent historical research has challenged some aspects of this por
trait. Even at the time, it turns out, the Founders' vision of the militia
contained a significant element of romanticized myth. Michael
Bellesiles has convincingly demonstrated that the colonial militias
were poorly armed, ill-trained and unreliable.37 Saul Cornell has
shown that militia eligibility was far from universal, and actual partici
pation even less so.38 Pennsylvania, for example, made militia service
contingent on acceptance of a rigorous loyalty oath; this requirement
rendered "as much as forty percent of the citizenry" ineligible.39
Moreover, the ability of wealthier citizens to pay others to substitute
for them meant that, in practice, militiamen were drawn dispropor
tionately from the poorer segments of the population, making the ac
tual composition of the militia closer to that of the army than the
Founders' ideal-types would suggest.40 Popular belief would have it
that the colonists won the Revolutionary War with militia - King
George had Hessian mercenaries, we had patriotic farmboys - but as
the conflict dragged on, the Continental Army came increasingly to
rely on full-time soldiers.41 By Yorktown, militiamen constituted
barely a third of the victorious American forces.42
35. AMAR, supra note 9, at 53, 55.
36. Id. at 53.
37. Bellesiles' study of probate records show that fewer than fifteen percent of probate
inventories from the period 1765-1790 listed firearms; as these probate inventories were
generally exhaustive, and as they describe the possessions of wealthier males - precisely the
people most likely to own firearms - they suggest an overall level of gun ownership below
ten percent. See Michael Bellesiles, Gun Culture, supra note 3, at 426-28. Bellesiles' esti
mates are confirmed by other contemporaneous data. See id. at 428-32, 438-47. Bellesiles
also demonstrates that many firearms in circulation during this period were either perma
nently nonfunctional or were kept in a state of disrepair such that making them functional
would require substantial effort, and that militiamen typically trained only one day a year
and were often poor marksmen. See id. at 433-38; see also Michael Bellesiles, Gun Laws, su
pra note 3; Michael Bellesiles, Suicide Pact, supra note 3.
38. See Cornell, supra note 3.
39. Id. at 228.
40. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 32, at 20-21; ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 63-66 (1976); MAHON, supra note 32, at 19, 37-38.
41. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 32, at 21-22 ("the rank and file of the Continental
Army . . . eventually became composed overwhelmingly of the young and the poor whites
and blacks - the sons of marginal farmers, laborers, drifters, indentured servants - and
recent immigrants without roots in America" ) ; see also ROYSTER, supra note 32, at 37
("Early in the war some revolutionaries argued that the militia, which had proven its compe
tence at Lexington and Bunker Hill, could sustain a large part of the resistance to the
British. By late 1776, little attachment to this idea remained.").
42. See MAHON, supra note 32, at 41.
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Yet while this research deepens our understanding of the realities
underlying the Founders' political theory, it is nonetheless clear that
the army/militia dichotomy was a fundamental part of that theory.43
The debates over the Constitution's military provisions were framed
entirely around the concepts of "militia" and "army." This conceptual
framework was orthodoxy in the intellectual tradition that informed so
much of the Founders' thinking. For example, in The Wealth of Na
tions, published in 1776, Adam Smith wrote: "In a militia, the charac
ter of the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of
the soldier: in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over
every other character. "44 Or as the Richmond Enquirer put it in 1812,
contrasting a regiment of Virginia militiamen marching off to battle
with army units: "This company is composed not of the dregs of soci
ety, culled from the by-lanes & alleys of the town, but of the flower of
our youth and the best blood of our country . . . . They have left the
caresses of friends, and the soft repose of their private life, to tread the
snows of Canada and the inhospitable wilds of the Savage."45
Most important, while the research of Bellesiles and Cornell does
show that the Founders' theory of the militia was hyperbolic, it does
not erase the underlying factual basis for the Founders' conceptual
distinction between militia and army.46 Militia membership was much
more widespread and distributed throughout society than army serv
ice. In essence, the militia was an arm of the community, while the
army was an arm of the government.
B.

The Military Clauses of the Original Constitution

Given their conceptual dichotomy, the drafters of the Constitution
had three options available to them: "We must either empower [Con43. Cf. CHAMBERS II, supra note 32, at 15 ("Even as it atrophied as a fighting system,
however, the militia remained important as a politico-military concept."); ROYSTER, supra
note 32, at 360 (arguing that even though the Revolutionary War was fought and won largely
by professional soldiers rather than militiamen, the Founding generation retained its ideo
logical hostility to standing armies and preference for militia: "The popular interpretation of
victory in the Revolutionary War rejected the officers' pretensions, abolished the army, and
in doing so restored the citizens to their original and vital stature as the pillars of America's
future glory.").
44. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 698 (R.H. Campbell, AS. Skinner, & W.B. Todd eds., Clarendon Press 1976). On
the influence of Adam Smith in particular on the Founders, see FONER, supra note 40, at
153-58.
45. LEE A. WALLACE, JR., THE PETERSBURG VOLUNTEERS, 1812-1813, 82 VA. MAG.
OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 460 (1974).
46. In a recent, short article, Edmund Morgan suggests that the discrepancy between the
actual strength of the militia and its ideological significance is explained by Founding-era
Americans' desire to identify themselves with the British yeomanry, and to distinguish them
selves from the French. See Edmund Morgan, In Love with Guns, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct 19,
2000, at30.
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gress] to employ, and rely altogether on, a standing army; or depend
altogether on militia; or else we must enable them to use the one or
the other of these two ways, as may be found most expedient."47 Re
viewing the debates surrounding the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution reveals a clear consensus that they found the latter op
tion - reliance on a combination of an army and the militia - the
most desirable. While a diversity of views existed among the Found
ers, there was broad agreement on three main points: (1) from the
point of view of democratic theory, militia were clearly superior to an
army; (2) from a military perspective, however, an army was clearly
superior to militia; (3) therefore, while the Constitution should give
Congress power to employ an army when necessary, states should con
tinue to maintain militia as an alternative - and counterweight - to
any federal army that might be established.
1.

The Dangers of a National Army

A core belief of the Founders, shared by Federalists and Anti
Federalists alike, was that "standing armies are dangerous to liberty."48
The main fear was that a would-be tyrant might use a standing army to
impose his will on the nation by force. In the words of a group of
leading Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists:
A standing army . . . may be made a fatal instrument to overturn the
public liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of the most
oppressive taxes, and to carry into execution the most arbitrary meas
ures. An ambitious man who may have the army at his devotion, may
step up into the throne, and seize upon absolute power.49
47. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 389 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1866) (statement of George
Nicholas) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 183 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 329 (Max Farrand ed.,
'
1911) (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (hereinafter FARRAND]; RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE
AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTAB LISHMENT
IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 2 ("No principle of government was more widely understood or
more completely accepted by the generation of Americans that established the United States
than the danger of a standing army in peacetime."); ROYSTER, supra note 32, at 35 ("The
political ideology that Americans adapted from the English Commonwealth writers warned
that a standing army in time of peace was an engine of oppression.").
49. 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 164 (Herbert J. Storing, ed. 1981) (statement
by Pennsylvania minority) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST]; see also 2 id. at
375 ("as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous, they are not to be kept up")
(Brutus II, New York Journal, Nov. 1, 1787); id. at 409 ("standing armies in times of
peace . . . generally prove the destruction of the happiness and liberty of the people")
(Brutus IX, Jan. 17, 1788); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 380 ("But when once a
standing army is established in any country, the people lose their liberty.") (statement of
George Mason at Virginia ratifying convention); 3 id. at 389 ("If a standing army were alone
to be employed, such an army must be kept up in times of peace as would be sufficient in
times of war. The dangers of such an army are so striking that every man would oppose the
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Less obviously, but just as important, many Founders believed that
a president would be easily tempted to use a standing army promiscu
ously in pursuit of empire and personal glory, thus bankrupting the na
tion and placing it at military risk. A citizen militia, by contrast, would
be much more resistant to adventurism. First, any attempt to use the
militia in cases other than genuine emergencies would meet stiff
popular resistance. Second, because militia units were state, rather
than national, entities, calling them forth would require the coopera
tion of state governors - or at least would present governors with op
portunities to challenge a President's decision to make war. For the
Founding generation, the prime example of the militia as a vehicle for
local opposition to imperial warmaking was the Seven Years' War,
when numerous militia units throughout New England refused to obey
the Crown's call to serve - disobedience that was supported in Con
necticut, at least, by the colonial governor himself.5° Forcing the fed
eral government to rely on state militias would have fit beautifully
with the Founders' guiding principle of checks and balances.
Finally, even during times of peace, a standing army would be ter
ribly expensive, necessitating ruinous taxation. The Federalist Papers
repeatedly base their argument for ratification on the ground that dis
united colonies would each be forced to provide for their own defense
and would need to be constantly on guard against their neighbors, thus
"present[ing] liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and
perpetual taxes. "51
2.

The Need for a National Army

Driven by these concerns, the drafters of the Articles of Confed
eration had made no provision for a national army; instead, the Arti
cles had authorized Congress only to determine an overall number of
troops to be raised in the event of military necessity, and to make req
uisitions on the states for their shares.
Some delegates wanted to continue that structure;52 others sought
to prohibit federal armies in peacetime, or to limit any such armies to
adoption of this government, had it been proposed by it as the only means of defence.")
(statement of George Nicholas).
50. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 163-64
(1992).

51. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 258 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See
also id. at 260 (a standing army is "burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liber
ties of the people"); George Washington, Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, 3 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 128-29 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ("[W]e
are too poor to maintain a standing Army adequate to our defence, and were our country
more populous and rich, still it could not be done without great oppression of the people.");
4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 49, at 207 ("An army, either in peace or
war, is like the locust and caterpillars of Egypt; they bear down all before them.").
52. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 48, at 242 (New Jersey plan).
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a specified size.53 But to most of the Founders, the military provisions
were among the Articles' signal weaknesses. Indeed, when Governor
Edmund Randolph of Virginia opened the Convention by "enu
merat[ing] the defects" of the Articles, he began with: "that the con
federation produced no security agai[nst] foreign invasion; congress
not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by th[eir] own
authority."54
The delegates, many of whom had fought in the Revolutionary
War, recognized that in the event of war with a European power, a
professional army would almost certainly be needed.55 Too, westward
expansion would lead inevitably to conflicts with Native Americans,
thereby requiring at least "a certain number of troops for guards and
garrisons."56 For none of these purposes would the militia suffice.
The Founders may have idealized the militia in some respects, but
they well understood its military limitations. The debates in Philadel
phia and the ratifying conventions are full of sardonic references to
the woeful state of the militia.57 As George Washington himself put it
in a letter to the Continental Congress in the midst of the war:
To place any dependence upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a bro
ken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life; un
accustomed to the din of arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of
military skill . . . [are] timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. Be
sides, the sudden change in their manner of living . . . produces shameful,
and scandalous desertions . . . Certain I am, that it would be cheaper to
keep 50,000 or 100,000 men in constant pay than to depend upon half the
number, and supply the other half occasionally by militia . . . .58
53. See, e.g., 2 id. at 329-30 (statement of Elbridge Gerry); id. at 326 (statement of
George Mason).
54. 1 id. at 19.
55. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 424-25 ("The safety of the Union and
particular states requires that the general government should have power to repel foreign
invasions.") (statement of James Madison); 4 id. at 98-99 (arguing that danger of British in
vasions is not over, and that an army is needed to repel foreign invasions) (statement of Mr.
Iredell); THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 170 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay) (arguing that trade and other relations with Euro
pean nations could lead to war).
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 170 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
57. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 389 ("Were we to be invaded by a
powerful, disciplined army, should we be safe with militia? Could men unacquainted with
the hardships, and unskilled in the disciplines of war . . . encounter with success the most
skillful veterans . . . ?") (statement of George Nicholas); 2 id. at 522 ("How powerful and
respectable must the body of militia appear under general and uniform regulations! How
disjointed, weak, and inefficient are they at present!") (statement of James Wilson); 5 id. at
465 ("The states neglect their militia now. . . . ) (statement of James Madison); 2 id. at 387
("Have we not found from experience, that, while the power of arming and governing the
militia has been solely vested in the state legislatures, they were neglected and rendered un
fit for immediate service?") (statement of James Madison).
"

58. THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 12 (Marjolijn Bijlefeld
ed., 1997) (reprinting letter dated September 24, 1776, from George Washington to the

December 2000]

Second Amendment & Constitutional Change

605

The very characteristics that made the militia attractive from the point
of view of democratic theory posed serious liabilities from the point of
view of military efficacy: unprofessionalism, regional nonuniformity,
strong ties to their home communities, and even local control. Debat
ing at the Philadelphia Convention, Edmund Randolph "observ[ed]
that the Militia were every where neglected by the State Legislatures,
the members of which courted popularity too much to enforce a
proper discipline."59 In sum, the Founders saw armies as potentially
dangerous but probably necessary.
3.

The Founders' Solution: State Militia as Both Alternative and
Counterwei�ht to a National Army

The Founders' solution to this problem was characteristically com
plex and structural. Congress would have power "to raise and support
Armies,"60 but the states would continue to maintain militia, which
would be available to the federal government when needed "to exe
cute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Inva
sions."61
Maintaining an able militia would mitigate the dangers of a stand
ing army in two ways. First, the availability of the militia would di
minish the need for the federal government to establish an army: "As
the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is best to
prevent them by an effectual provision for a good Militia."62
Second, if the unthinkable were to happen, and the federal gov
ernment did indeed overstep its constitutional boundaries, relying on
its army to quell opposition, the state militia would be there to resist.
James Madison explained this in a famous passage from Federalist No.
46:
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be
formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government:
still it would not be going too far to say that the State governments with
the people on their side would be able to repel the danger. The highest

President of the Continental Congress); see also 2 FARRAND, supra note 48, at 332 ("Mr.
[Charles Cotesworth] Pinkney . . . had however but a scanty faith in Militia. There must be
(also) a real military force . . . . The United States had been making an experiment without
it, and we see the consequences in their rapid approaches toward anarchy.")
59. 2 FARRAND, supra note 48, at 387.
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
62. 2 FARRAND, supra note 48, at 388 (statement of James Madison); see also 3 id. at
318-319 ("If insurrections should arise, or invasions should take place, the people ought un
questionably to be employed to suppress and repel them, rather then a standing army. The
best way to do these things, was to put the militia on a good and sure footing, and enable the
government to make use of their services when necessary . . . .") (statement of Alexander
Hamilton).
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number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can
be carried in any country does not exceed one-hundredth part of the
whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to
bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an
army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would
be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with
arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves,
fighting for their common liberties and united and conducted by gov
ernments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be
doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered
by such a proportion of regular troops. . . . Besides the advantage of be
ing armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every
other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the
people are attached and by which the militia officers are appointed,
forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable
than any which a simple government of any form can admit of.63

Indeed, the very presence of the militia would deter power-hungry
federal officials from even entertaining such schemes.
These two purposes for the militia - both alternative and coun
terweight to a federal army - were somewhat in tension. On one
hand, if they are to serve as an alternative to an army, the militia
should be readily available to the federal government. On the other
hand, subjecting the militia too much to federal authority could lessen
their utility as a counterweight - or possibly even transform the mili
tia itself into a federal standing army.
Accordingly, the intricate militia clauses in Section 8 of Article I
received considerable attention at the Philadelphia Convention. To
ensure that the militia would effectively substitute for an army, the
drafters gave Congress authority to "provide for organizing, arming
and disciplining the Militia. "64 Some delegates feared this gave the
federal government too much control. The prevailing view, however,
was that federal regulation of militia training was necessary for the
militia to be a reliable military force; without federal oversight, the
militia would remain ragtag and incoherent, and the national govern
ment would be forced to tum to an army.65
At the same time, the drafters made sure that the militia would
remain fundamentally state, rather than federal, institutions. Most
prominently, the provision for "calling forth" the militia envisioned a
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This
passage nicely captures the distinction between the federal government's army and the
states' militia. Militia officers are to be selected by the states, and Madison unquestioningly
assumes that the militiamen will be "attached to" the states. Note, too, the subtle brilliance
with which Madison contrasts army "men" with militia "citizens." See also infra text accom
panying note 204 (noting that Madison's argument assumes an enlisted army and a con
scripted militia).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
65. See_supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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federal requisition upon the states. The federal government was given
operational control to "govern[]" only "such Part of [the Militia] as
may be employed in the Service of the United States," and only during
periods of "actual service" to the federal government.66
The delegates also explicitly "reserv[ed] to the States respectively,
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."67 James
Madison's proposal to permit the federal government to appoint sen
ior militia officers was met with outrage: "Let us at once destroy the
State Govts have an Executive for life or hereditary, and a proper
Senate, and then there would be some consistency in giving [this
power] to the Genl Govt. "68
The point is driven home further in Article II, where the President
is denoted "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the· several States, when called into the ac
tual Service of the United States."69 The contrast between the federal
Army and Navy and the state Militia is clear. Even when undertaking
national tasks under the direction of the President, the militia remain
"of the several States."
C.

The Framing of the Second Amendment

Many Anti-Federalists, however, were not satisfied with the plan
crafted by the Philadelphia drafters. In the conventions called to ratify
the Constitution, and in pamphlets circulated to influence those con
ventions, Anti-Federalists blasted the proposed central government as
too powerful. The military provisions - the Armies clause and both
of the militia clauses - were among the greatest sources of contro
versy.
Anti-Federalists raised a number of specific objections to the pro
posed constitution's military provisions. First, as in Philadelphia, some
sought direct limits on Congress' power to raise armies, such as a su
permajority requirement for congressional approval,70 or a numeric
limit on the size of any federal army.71 But again, considerations of
military necessity made these proposals unacceptable.
66. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cL 16.

67. Id.
68. 2 FARRAND, supra note 48, at 388 (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
69. U.S. CONST, art II, § 2, cL L

70. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 49, at 243 (reprinting let
ter from "The Federal Farmer"); 2 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 406 (proposal of
Mr. Lansing that raising of peacetime army require congressional supermajority); see also 1
id. at 88 (proposal by New Jersey ratification convention that assent of nine states be re
quired for peacetime army).
71. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 47, at 58 (reprinting
Luther Martin's "The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of
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Next, the Anti-Federalists turned their attention to the militia
clauses. The Calling Forth clause, some argued, was too expansive,
and would create innumerable opportunities to call forth the militia on
the pretext of a necessity to "execute the laws." In part, the concern
was that militiamen would be mistreated. Luther Martin declared that
"Congress will have the power, if they please, to march the whole mili
tia of Maryland to the remotest part of the Union, and keep them in
service as long as they think proper . . . [and the militiamen] may,
during such service, be subjected to military law, and tied up and
whipped at the halbert, like the meanest of slaves."72 But the deeper
concern evoked the fear of standing armies: By making militia service
onerous, George Mason argued, the federal government "would har
ass the people so much that they would agree to abolish the use of the
militia, and establish a standing army."73 At least some federal uses of
the militia, the Anti-Federalists argued, should be made subject to
state consent.74
Federalist supporters of the Constitution were unmoved by these
arguments. The best security against a standing army, the Federalists
argued, was to make the militia as available as possible to the federal
government - that way, the temptation to maintain a peacetime army
would be minimized.75
The Anti-Federalists made a separate and more powerful objec
tion to Congress' power to "provide for organizing, arming, and disci
plining" the militia. Here, some Anti-Federalists characterized this as
an "exclusive right" of Congress. Once again, the force of the com
plaint came from an underlying fear of standing armies. George
Mason forecast that the federal government would "neglect [the mili
tia], and let them perish, in order to have a pretence of establishing a
standing army. "76
The Federalist response to this objection was to deny that Con
gress' powers were exclusive - if the federal government failed to en
sure a well-prepared militia, the states could certainly do so on their
own. Notably, this response focused solely on correct interpretation of
Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Philadel
phia"); id. at 416 (reprinting "Essays of Brutus").

72. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 371. See also 3 id. at 378 (statement of
George Mason) (arguing that the federal government might call up the Georgia militia to
respond to a disturbance in New Hampshire).
73. 3 id. at 378 (statement of George Mason).
74. See, e.g., 2 id. at 406 (proposal of Mr. Lansing).
75. See 3 id. at 392 ("If you give [power to call forth the militia] not to Congress, it may
be denied by the states. If you withhold it, you render a standing army absolutely necessary;
for if they have not the militia, they must have such a body of troops as will be necessary for
the general defence of the Union.") (statement of George Nicholas).
76. 3 id. at 379 (statement of George Mason).
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the constitutional text rather than any substantive disagreement. As to
the principle underlying the Anti-Federalist objection - that states
must have the ability to arm and train their militia - the Federalists
agreed completely. Thus when the Federalists decided a Bill of Rights
was necessary to address a host of Anti-Federalist concerns, the Anti
Federalist proposal for a right to keep and bear arms was unproblem
atic (unlike proposals to limit Congress' power to raise armies or de
ploy the militia). As any draftsperson knows, when two parties negoti
ating a document agree on a principle, but one side feels that the text
of the document does not express the principle clearly enough, the
other side rarely finds it worthwhile to insist on the adequacy of the
text; the usual solution is to make the document clearer still. Similarly,
the Anti-Federalist proposal of a Second Amendment was easily un
derstood as strengthening language in the original Constitution specifically, Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16.77 The Second
Amendment functioned with respect to these provisions just as the
Tenth Amendment did with respect to Article I, Section 8 generally it was an affirmation that only certain, specifically described powers
had been granted to the federal government, and that residual power
remained with the states.
The depth of the Founders' concern to ensure state control of the
militia - a concern shared by both Federalists and Anti-Federalists is shown in the debates in the First Congress concerning what became
the Second Amendment. Congressional consideration of the Bill of
Rights began with a resolution offered by James Madison containing
the following proposed amendment: "The right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated
militia being the best security of a free country: but no person relig
iously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render mili
tary service in person."78 Virtually all of the debate over this proposal
focused on the third clause - the conscientious objector provision.
Elbridge Gerry, the leading Anti-Federalist voice among the congres
sional drafters, argued that the proposed clause would give the federal
77. Note, too, that the actual debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists focused
not so much on the specter of the federal government prohibiting citizens to arm themselves,
but on the fear that neither the federal government nor the states would actively arm citizen
militiamen. This accords perfectly with the findings of recent historical scholarship that arms
ownership in the Founding period was expensive, difficult, and not at all widespread.
See Bellesiles, Gun Culture, supra note 3. For the Founders' delicate balance to work, it
would not be sufficient for government merely to permit arms ownership; rather, govern
ment needed actively to foster arms ownership. The revisionists tum this history on its head
- the Founders' main fear was not that the federal government would disarm militiamen,
but that it would fail to arm them.
78. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS 1 2 (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling & Charlene Bangs Bickford
eds., 1991) (hereinafter DOCUMENTARY RECORD) (resolution offered in the House of Rep
resentatives by James Madison on June 8, 1789).
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government too much authority to determine militia eligibility, a pre
rogative properly left to the states:
Now I am apprehensive, sir, that this clause would give an opportunity to
the people in power to destroy the constitution itself. They can declare
who are those religiously scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing
arms. What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent establishment of a
standing army, the bane of liberty. Now it must be evident, that under
this provision, together with their other powers, congress could take such
measures with respect to a militia, as make a standing army necessary.79

Other representatives agreed,80 and the provision was dropped.
Congress' other drafting changes are also illuminating. Madison's
original version had declared a well-regulated militia to be "the best
security of a free country." First, Congress replaced "the best" with
"necessary to the," underscoring the Founders' profound distrust of
standing armies. As Elbridge Gerry put it: "A well-regulated militia
being the best security of a free state, admitted an idea that a standing
army was a secondary one."81 Next, Congress replaced "country" with
"State," eliminating any possible suggestion that the militia were to be
considered national entities, and highlighting their role in protecting
the states against the possibility of an overweening federal govern
ment.82 The core concern of the Second Amendment, reflected in both
of these changes, was protecting the delicately balanced military struc
ture envisioned by the Founders - an army constitutionally available,
but obviated by a well-prepared, state-based militia.83
D. Second Amendment Practice in the Founding Period
For the first several decades after ratification, the military struc
ture set in place by the Founders functioned much as they had in
tended. The initial test of the system came in 1794 with the Whiskey
Rebellion in western Pennsylvania. Although the federal government
had by this time established an army of approximately 3,500 soldiers84
(actually, it had simply assumed command of the army raised under
79. Id. at 182 (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
80. See id. at 182-84.
81. Id. at 184 (reprinting The Congressional Register, August 17, 1789).
82. The change from "country" to "State" was made by a select committee charged by
the House with revising Madison's proposal. See id. at 30. This committee left no surviving
records of its deliberations. My characterization of the change is based solely on inference
from the words themselves.
83. The only other change Congress made to Madison's original draft of the Amend
ment was to reverse the order of the clauses, pushing the "well regulated militia" language to
the front of the sentence. The change is minor, but it, too, arguably highlights Congress' in
tention that the Amendment prevent threats to the militia, and not to arms ownership gen
erally.
84. See KOHN, supra note 48, at 149.
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the Articles of Confederation),85 this force was deemed too small to
suppress the insurrection, and in any event it was engaged fighting Na
tive Americans elsewhere along the frontier. Accordingly, President
Washington called forth militia from Maryland, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia.86 As the Founders had hoped, the Presi
dent's first recourse was not to an army, but rather to the militia.
Even this relatively minor episode, though, illustrated tensions
within the Founders' plan. On the plus side - for the federalist sys
tem, if not for the national government - federal reliance on militia
gave states a genuine voice in military policy. In return for the coop
eration of Governor Thomas Mifflin in mobilizing Pennsylvania's mili
tia, Washington reluctantly postponed a military response for several
weeks to permit continued negotiation with the rebels.87
On the other hand, the Founders' skepticism about the reliability
of the militia proved well-founded. The states encountered serious dif
ficulty raising the 13,000 men requested by Washington.88 In several
areas, militiamen called into service refused to comply; in Maryland,
militiamen "beat their officers from the field."89 Those who did join
were poorly disciplined and deserted in high numbers.90 In the end,
though, the force was assembled and the (fortunately insubstantial)
insurrection defeated; having done their duty, the militiamen returned
home.
Soon thereafter, however, the War of 1812 presented the Found
ers' system with a major challenge. The circumstances were just as the
architects of the Second Amendment had feared. Now-President
Madison (in an ironic illustration of his own observation that even
great men cannot be trusted in positions of power) had pushed the
country into war not to defend itself but to protect commercial ship
ping routes and to conquer Canada.91 This was precisely the sort of ex
pensive, expansionist venture that the Founders' balance between the
army and the militia was supposed to prevent. But if the Founders'
system failed to prevent the war, their insights nonetheless proved cor
rect. The Administration had great difficulty attracting volunteers and
generating congressional support for the taxes needed to pay a volun-

85. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95.
86. See THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION 3 (1986); see also Act of
May 9, 1794, ch. 27, Stat. 367 (authorizing President to call forth militia).
87. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 196; see also KOHN, supra note 48, at 162.
88. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 207-14.
89. Id. at 210; see also id. at 207-10.
90. See id. at 214-15.
91. See ALAN LLOYD, THE SCORCHING OF WASHINGTON: THE WAR OF 1812 1 1 -30
(1974).
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teer army.92 In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the governors refused
to comply with Madison's request for militia units on the ground that
invading Canada did not qualify as a constitutionally legitimate pur
pose for calling forth the militia.93
The constitutional crisis came late in the war, when Madison pro
posed a draft (the actual author of the proposal was another leading
Jeffersonian, future President James Monroe94). Opponents in Con
gress saw the proposal as fundamentally inconsistent with the Found
ers' vision.95 Conscription would remove a key element from the con
stitutional framework: the role of the states as intervening layers
between the federal government and the citizen-soldiers. As Daniel
Webster, leader of the opposition, argued, Madison's proposal
amounted to "raising a standing army out of the militia by draft."96
Webster continued with a thinly-veiled threat of resistance: "It will be
the solemn duty of the State Governments to protect their own
authority over their own militia, and to interpose between their citi
zens and arbitrary power."97
This was no idle warning. Following the precedent of the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions in 1798, representatives from five states
convened in Hartford to proclaim their opposition to Madison's poli
cies, and in particular the draft. The Report and Resolutions of the
Hartford Convention declared:
RESOLVED - That it be and hereby is recommended to the legisla
tures of the several states represented in this Convention, to adopt all
such measures as may be necessary effectually to protect the citizens of
said states from . . . all acts . . . subjecting the militia or other citizens to
forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, not authorised by the
constitution of the United States.

92. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 32, at 32-34; MAHON, supra note 32, at 67-68; SAMUEL
ELIOT MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 383-91 (1965).
93. See MAHON, supra note 32, at 67-68; MORRISON, supra note 92, at 383. Under Arti
cle I, § 8, cl. 15, the militia could be called forth only "to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."
94. See James Monroe, Recommendations for a Federal Draft, in THE MILITARY
DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION 503-13 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982).
95. I follow Akhil Amar in using the War of 1812 draft controversy as an example of
Second Amendment practice. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 57-58.
96. 1 PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 21 (Charles M. Wiltse ed. 1986). Ironically, it was
Federalists like Webster who opposed the war and the draft and relied on these states' rights
arguments. In later life, at least, Webster was an ardent nationalist. The Jeffersonian Demo
cratic-Republicans who initiated and propelled the war were in many other ways ideological
heirs of the Anti-Federalists. The war is thus a marvelous example both of how assuming
power can change a party's ideology, and of how simple summaries of such an ideology are
invariably misleading; in this case, the Jeffersonians' affinity for France and hostility toward
England overrode their decentralizing impulse.
97. Id. at 30.
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Resolved, That it be and hereby is recommended to the said Legisla
tures, to authorize an immediate and earnest application to be made to
the government of the United States, requesting their consent to some
arrangement, whereby the said states may, separately or in concert, be
empowered to assume upon themselves the defence of their terri
tory . . . . 98

None of the conscription bills were enacted - and denied his con
scripted army, Madison soon made peace. The key principles under
lying the military clauses of Article I and the Second Amendment the balance between a federal army and state-controlled militia - had
been confirmed. As Amar puts it, "The eventual republican triumph
on this issue . . . should be as central a precedent for our Second
Amendment as the 1800 triumph over the Sedition Act is for our
First."99
II.

E VALUATING THE REVISIONIST AR G UMENT

I will resume the historical narrative shortly (at the risk of ruining
the suspense, I can say now that the Founders' framework is in for
some serious changes). But first, I want to pause to consider the revi
sionists' arguments in light of the history recounted in Part I.
As I stated at the outset, the revisionists have produced a large
body of writing arguing that the Second Amendment creates an "indi
vidual right" to own guns, and criticizing contemporary courts for in
stead interpreting the Amendment as conferring a "collective right."
The first step in evaluating these claims is to establish precisely what
the claims are. That task is more difficult than one might suppose, as
both the revisionists and the courts they are criticizing have presented
their positions in confusing ways.
A.

The "Collective Rights " Red Herring

Start with the courts. The essence of modern Second Amendment
doctrine is that the Amendment prohibits only statutes which interfere
with the "preservation or efficiency" of the states' militia.100 Some
courts, in applying this doctrine, have referred to the Amendment as
creating a "collective right";101 one court has even referred to the Sec
ond Amendment right as being "held by the States."102 The revisionists
98. Report and Resolutions of the Hartford Convention, in 2 GREAT ISSUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 240 (Richard Hofstadter ed., 1958).
99. AMAR, supra note 9, at 58.
100. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 177 (1939).
101. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th
Cir. 1974).
102. Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996).
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have ridiculed this terminology, suggesting it means that only states
can challenge statutes under the Second Amendment. To the contrary,
the revisionists insist, all rights are "held" by individuals.
They have a point - but not one that goes very far. Certainly, an
individual plaintiff or defendant can raise a Second Amendment claim
in the hope of invalidating a statute that harms the individual. In this
trivial sense, all constitutional rights are "individual rights." Consider,
for example, the enumerated powers doctrine. In the Emerson case,
the defendant raised an enumerated-powers claim in addition to his
Second Amendment claim; he argued that Congress lacked power un
der the Commerce Clause to prohibit persons subject to restraining
orders from possessing guns.103 Suppose the Emerson Court had struck
down the law on that basis rather than the Second Amendment (not
an outlandish supposition in light of United States v. Lopez104 and
United States v. Morrison105). Does that make the enumeration of
powers an "individual rights" doctrine? Or put another way: Calling
the enumeration of powers an "individual rights" doctrine tells us
nothing about the real issue raised by Emerson's Commerce Clause
claim, �hich is whether the challenged statute thwarts the
governmental-structure purposes underlying the enumeration of pow
ers.
Similarly, the mere fact that individual American citizens have
standing to raise Second Amendment claims in court tells us nothing
about the scope of the protection granted by the Amendment.
Timothy Emerson of course had standing to rely on the Second
Amendment in challenging the statute under which he was prose
cuted. In that sense, the Second Amendment right is not a "collective
right" - it is not "held by the States" - but it may well be a militia
focused right in that it protects Emerson only from s_tatutes that inter
fere with the states' militia.
The revisionists' focus on the standing issue is a red herring.106 It
obscures the real issue in their dispute with the courts, which is about
103. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d 598, 599-600 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
104. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked authority under Commerce
Clause to enact provision of Gun Free School Zones Act).
105. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked
authority under Commerce Clause to enact provision of Violence Against Women Act ).
106. Well, maybe not a pure red herring. At least one federal court has employed the
militia-focused approach as a standing argument. See Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("Because the Second Amendment guarantees the rights of the states to maintain
armed militia, the states alone stand in the position to show legal injury when this right is
infringed."). Perhaps Hickman simply demonstrates that critics of standing doctrine are right
to claim that its injury requirement is circular, and that court decisions dismissing complaints
for lack of standing are equivalent to dismissals for failure to state a claim. Cf Steven L.
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1373 (1988) (describing and rejecting argument that standing doctrine is "a sophisti
cated manipulation for the sub rosa decision of cases on their merits"). But to those who do
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the scope of the Second Amendment right, and not about who can
seek its vindication.
B.

The Libertarian Red Herring

Once this issue is clearly stated, we can begin to focus on the revi
sionists' and the courts' differing understandings of the scope of the
Second Amendment right. The revisionists typically posit a simple di
chotomy between their "individual rights" approach to the Amend
ment and the modern courts' militia-focused approach. In truth, how
ever, there are strong and weak versions of the revisionists'
"individual-rights" approach, and their implications differ signifi
cantly.
The strong version is essentially libertarian; it sees the right to
keep and bear arms as akin to the First Amendment rights of free
speech and conscience - a fundamental aspect of individual auton
omy the infringement of which is per se tyrannical.107 The libertarian
Second Amendment right is sometimes derived from trivial autonomy
interests such as an individual's ability to hunt or to engage in recrea
tional shooting, but at its core is the assuredly nontrivial interest in
self-defense. The notion is that a government that forces its citizens to
remain defenseless against bullies and predators is no better than a
government that itself subjects its citizens to "unreasonable" searches
and seizures. It is this version of the revisionists' argument, which I
will call the "Libertarian Approach,'' that was adopted by the
Emerson Court108 and suggested by Justice Thomas in his Printz con
currence.109
The Libertarian Approach may have philosophical appeal, but the
history recounted in Part I renders it highly implausible as constitu
tional interpretation.U0 The revisionists' main argument for ignoring
distinguish between standing requirements and the other elements that a plaintiff must dem
onstrate in order to obtain relief, I suggest that Hickman was incorrect, and that accepting a
militia-focused approach to the Second Amendment does not entail dismissing any suit
brought by an individual citizen under the Second Amendment for lack of standing. For an
example of a revisionist scholar presenting the militia-focused approach as a standing argu
ment, see AMAR, supra note 9, at 221.
107. For examples of revisionist scholarship adopting this view, see Dowlut, supra note
3; Lund, supra note 3.
108. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
109. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring).
1 10. In addition to its inconsistency with the specific legislative history we have dis
cussed, the Libertarian Approach suffers from a more basic anachronism. It ignores the
findings of historians such as Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood and J.G.A. Pocock, who have
shown that the Founders' political theory was deeply republican. See BERNARD BAILYN,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992); J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); WOOD, supra note 50; GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); see also Williams, The Terrify-
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this history is textual. They read the Amendment's description of a
right "to keep and bear Arms" as obviously and necessarily conveying
an intention to protect individual gun ownership whether or not such
ownership is related to militia service.m
One problem with this reading is that it ignores the first half of the
Amendment. Read as a whole - "A well regulated Militia, being nec
essary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed" - the Amendment straight
forwardly declares its aim to preserve the "well regulated Militia" that
are "necessary to the security of a free State." The revisionists seek to
ing Second Amendment, supra note 3 (describing the Second Amendment as rooted in re
publican political theory). Only since this republicanism has waned have Americans commit
ted themselves to the sort of "individual right" imagined by the Libertarian Approach.
1 1 1 . Some revisionists buttress this textual argument with a historical argument to the
effect that the Second Amendment incorporated an English tradition of protecting arms
ownership by individuals, dating at least to the 1689 English Bill of Rights. See generally
MALCOLM, supra note 3; see also Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d at 602. Undoubtedly the English
Bill of Rights was an important precedent for the Founders - but rather than supporting
the Libertarian Approach, this precedent argues in favor of a militia-focused interpretation
of the Second Amendment. Defending that claim in full would require too long a detour
from my central argument in this Article, but here is the defense in a nutshell: The English
Bill of Rights resulted from a 60-year struggle for power between the largely Protestant Par
liament and a succession of Stuart kings allied with Catholic interests. See generally BARRY
COWARD, THE STUART AGE: A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1603-1714 (1980); LAWRENCE
STONE, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1529-1642 (1972). Parliament finally
won the conflict, installing a Protestant king and adopting a Bill of Rights containing the
following:
Whereas the late King James II . . did endeavor to subvert and extirpate the Protestant re
ligion and the laws and liberties of this kingdom . . . by raising and keeping a standing army
within this kingdom in time of peace without consent of parliament and . . . by causing sev
eral good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both
armed and employed contrary to law, . . . [we] declare . . . that the raising or keeping a
standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament,
is against law; that the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense suit
able to their conditions and as allowed by law . . . .
.

SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 600-01 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick
George Marcham eds. and trans., 1937). These provisions were designed to ensure a feudal
militia in which each lord commanded men-in-arms from the areas under his dominion. The
Stuart kings had wanted a centralized militia with officers appointed by the king. Compare
id. at 486 (reprinting The Militia Ordinance of 1642) with id. at 541 (reprinting Militia Act of
1661). Thus the guarantee was limited to Protestants, and it applied only to arms "suitable to
their conditions" (meaning status in the feudal hierarchy). It explicitly recognized the nu
merous common law and statutory restrictions on gun possession which existed both before
and after adoption of the English Bill of Rights. See Bellesiles, Gun Laws, supra note 3, at
571-73. The purpose of the English Bill of Rights was not to protect individual British citi
zens' rights to own weapons but to guarantee that Parliament's noblemen would be able to
field armed forces independent of the crown - a concern directly analogous to that of the
American Anti-Federalists who sought to prevent the new central government from mo
nopolizing military force.
As an alternative to relying on British history, some revisionists have recently argued for
the Libertarian Approach on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. See AMAR, supra note 9;
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998). I consider this argument infra Section IV.A.
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avoid this straightforward reading by decoupling the Amendment's
two halves. They call the first half ("A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State") a "justification clause"112 or a
"prefatory phrase"113 or a "cautionary note,"114 and they insist that the
second half ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed") provides the force of the Amendment and must be read
independently.
Eugene Volokh has recently provided a rationale for this interpre
tive move, demonstrating that it was "commonplace" for state consti
tutional drafters in the late 18th Century to preface rights-granting
provisions with "purpose clauses," and that these purpose clauses
were not read strictly to limit the right at issue.115 At most, however,
Volokh's work shows that the scope of a constitutional provision is not
necessarily limited by its "purpose clause" - he provides no excuse
for ignoring the Second Amendment's purpose clause altogether, as
the revisionists' Libertarian Approach does.116
More important, splitting the Amendment in two is simply artifi
cial, because both halves of the Amendment - the "bear Arms" lan
guage as well as the "well regulated Militia" language - reflect the
Founders' purpose of protecting the militia. The revisionists read the
phrase "bear Arms" as equivalent to "carry guns" - but to the
Amendment's framers, the phrase "bear Arms" itself denoted the
military possession of weapons. While the revisionist's reading of the
"plain text" of the Amendment may at first glance seem appealing,
112. Volokh, supra note 3, at 796.
1 13. Lund, supra note 3, at 21.
1 14. Reynolds, supra note 3, at 467.
1 15. Volokh, supra note 3.
116. In addition to the ordinary principle against rendering any constitutional text
"mere surplusage," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803), a close look at the grammar
of the Second Amendment suggests that the Founders intended the Amendment to be read
as a unitary whole. Note that the drafters inserted two unusual commas in the Amendment;
under ordinary usage, the first and third commas are unnecessary. If these commas had not
been inserted, it might be possible to understand the first half of the Amendment as simply
explaining the rationale for the second half (the Amendment would then read: "A well
regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed."). Instead, the first unusual comma - between
"Militia" and "being" - forces the reader to search for a verb for which "Militia" is the
subject. That verb does not appear until "shall not be infringed" near the end of the
Amendment. The second unusual comma - between "Arms" and "shall" - sets off the
verb phrase "shall not be infringed" from the preceding language; it suggests that the subject
for this verb phrase is not simply "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms." The
grammatical effect of these two unusual commas is to link "A well regulated Militia" to
"shall not be infringed" - to emphasize, in other words, that the goal of the Amendment is
to protect the militia against federal interference. I do not place enormous weight on this
argument, but considering that the use of punctuation in the Constitution generally con
forms to modern conventions, and that the Second Amendment was redrafted at least twice
during the First Congress, I do believe the Amendment's curious punctuation supports a
militia-focused reading.

618

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 99:588

that is only because the ordinary meaning of the phrase "bear Arms"
has changed over time.
The clearest evidence of the framers' understanding of the lan
guage is in the original draft of the Amendment proposed in the First
Congress by James Madison: "The right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated mili
tia being the best security of a free country: but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military serv
ice in person [emphasis added]."117 In the last clause of this version
(the conscientious objector provision), Madison clearly used the
phrase "bearing arms" to refer solely to the possession of weapons for
military use. There is no reason to think that virtually the same phrase
- "bear arms" - should have a different, much broader meaning
elsewhere in the very same sentence.
Madison's use of the phrase "bear arms" to refer to military activi
ties is echoed in other contemporary usages. Thus the Declaration of
Independence charged King George with forcing captive Americans
to "bear arms against their country. "118 Searching a Library of Con
gress database containing all official records of debates in the Conti
nental and U.S. Congresses between 1774 and 1821 reveals thirty uses
of the phrase "bear arms" or "bearing arms" (other than in discussing
the proposed Second Amendment); in every single one of these uses,
the phrase has an unambiguously military meaning.1 19 The Continental
Congress, for example, approved a prisoner exchange with the British
conditioned on the returned prisoners being forbidden to "bear arms"
for a specified period, 120 and the Twelfth Congress debated legislation
concerning prisoners taken "whilst voluntarily bearing arms in the
service of Great Britain. "121

117. DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 78, at 12. See also 6 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 345 (William F. Swindler ed., 1 976) (re
printing New Hampshire Constitution of 1784: "No person who is conscientiously scrupulous
about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be compelled thereto, provided he will pay on
equivalent."); 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 335 (reprinting constitutional amend
ment proposed by Rhode Island's 1790 ratifying convention: "That the people have a right
to keep and bear arms; . . . That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to
be exempted upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.").
118. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 62.
119. A CENTURY OF LAWMAKING FOR A NEW NATION: U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
DOCUMENTS AND D EBATES, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammen/amlaw/lawhome.
html [hereinafter CENTURY OF LAWMAKING]. I didn't choose the dates to search - that is
what was available at the time of writing.
120. JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 1030 (Tues., Nov. 7,
1780) (Worthington c. Ford et al. eds., 1904-1937), available at CENTURY OF LAWMAKING,
supra note 119.
121. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1873, at 264
(n.p, n.d.), available at CENTURY OF LAWMAKING, supra note 119.
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These usages were standard at the time the Second Amendment
was adopted. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "to bear arms" as
meaning "to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight."122 It defines
"to bear arms against" as meaning "to be engaged in hostilities
with."123 As an exemplary use of the phrase in 1769, the OED gives
"An ample . . . pardon to all who had born arms against him," and the
exemplary use from 1609 is: "He bure armes, and made weir against
the king."124 The most persuasive account of the etymology of the
phrase "bear arms" remains that of Garry Wills, who elegantly con
cludes: "To bear arms is such a synonym for waging war that
Shakespeare can call a just war 'just-borne arms' and a civil war 'self
borne arms'."125
Indeed, the word "arms" itself has a primarily military connota
tion. According to the OED, the oldest established meaning of "arms"
(other than as the plural of "arm," meaning limb) is "armour, mail."126
The next oldest meaning is "[i]nstruments of offence used in war;
weapons."127 The OED quotes a 1794 dictionary: "By arms, we under
stand those instruments of offence generally made use of in war; such
as firearms, swords, etc. By weapons, we more particularly mean in
struments of other kinds (exclusive of fire-arms), made use of as of
fensive on special occasions. "128 Accordingly, nineteenth-century
judges had no trouble understanding that "the phrase 'bear arms' . . .
has a military sense, and no other . . . . A man in the pursuit of deer,
elk and buffaloes, might carry his rifle every day, for forty years, and,
yet, it would never be said of him, that he had borne arms . . . . "129
122. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH D ICTIONARY 634 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed.
1989).
123. 2 id. at 21.
124. Id. (alteration in original).
125. Garry Wills To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995 (tracing
etymology of phrase bear arms and concluding that dominant meaning is military); see also
GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL 252-60 (2000) (same).
126. 1 O XFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 122, at 633-34.
127. Id. at 634.
128. Id.
129. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161 (1840) (interpreting Tennessee Con
stitution); see also Ex parte Rameriz, 226 P. 914, 921 (Cal. 1924) ("An examination of the
numerous authorities in various states will show that the right to keep and bear arms as
guaranteed by a state constitutional provision similar to the federal amendment refers only
to the bearing of arms by the citizens in defense of a common cause."); Hill v. State, 53 Ga.
473, 474 (1874) ("The language of the constitution of this state, as well as that of the United
States, guarantees only the right to keep and bear the 'arms' necessary for a militiaman.");
City of Salina v. Blaksly, 72 Kan. 230, 232 (1905) (Both U.S. and Kansas Constitutions
"appl[y] only to the right to bear arms as a member of the state militia, or some other mili
tary organization provided by law."); Ex parte Thomas, 21 Okla. 770 (1908) (interpreting
Oklahoma Constitution) ("As the object for which the right to keep and bear arms is se
cured is of general and public nature, to be exercised by the people in a body, for their com
mon defense, so the arms, the right to keep which is secured, are such as are usually em-
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Now, I do not mean to say there are no examples at all of
Founding-era uses of the phrase "bear arms" in a non-military sense.
There are such examples, and the revisionists make the most of
them.130 A full review of the evidence, however, shows that at the time
ployed in civilized warfare.") (quoting Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 158); English v. State, 35 Tex.
473, 476 (1872) ("The word 'arms' in the connection we find it in the Constitution of the
United States refers to the arms of a militiaman or soldier, and the word is used in its mili
tary sense."); State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1891) ("[I]n regard to the kind of arms
referred to in the [Second A]mendment, it must be held to refer to weapons of warfare to be
used by the militia."); cf JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
STATUTORY CRIMES § 792, at 497 (1873) (Second Amendment "protects only the right to
'keep' such 'arms' as are used for purposes of war . . . since such, only, are properly known
by the name of 'arms;' and such, only, are adapted to promote 'the security of a free State.'
In like manner, the right to 'bear' arms refers merely to the military way of using
them. . . . "); Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV.
L. REV. 473, 476 (1915) ("The single individual or the unorganized crowd, in carrying weap
ons, is not spoken of or thought of as 'bearing arms.' ").
The presence of the word "keep" in the Second Amendment does not change the
Amendment's fundamentally military meaning. The consistent use of the phrase "keep and
bear arms" by the Founders and their forebears suggests that it should be understood as a
single term of art, such as "arbitrary and capricious" or "willful, deliberate and premedi
tated." If we feel the need to give "keep" an independent meaning in the Amendment, we
can do so by reading it simply preclude a narrow interpretation of the Amendment that
would protect only the possession of firearms by persons actively engaged in militia duties
(permitting, for example, the federal government to require weapons to be stored in a cen
tral depository). The Founders were in fact concerned about such a possibility, as they had
seen the British seek to require Massachusetts militiamen to bring their weapons to an ar
mory - where they would have been easily controlled by British troops. By protecting the
right to "keep" as well as "bear" arms, the Founders may have seen the Amendment as en
suring that militiamen would be able to store their weapons at home, thus making militia
disarmament more difficult.

130. The example relied upon most heavily by the revisionists is the "Pennsylvania Mi
nority Report," a dissenting statement issued by Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists after losing
the ratification vote in their state convention. See 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, su
pra note 49, at 145 (reprinting "The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the
Convention of Pennsylvania To Their Constituents"); see also, e.g. , Kates, Original Meaning,
supra note 3, at 222 (citing Pennsylvania Minority Report); David B. Kopel, The Second
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1406-07 (same); Lund, su
pra note 3, at 60-61 (same). This document contained a series of proposed amendments to
the new Constitution, including this:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own state,
or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for dis
arming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public in
jury from individuals; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty,
they ought not to be kept up: and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to

and be governed by the civil powers.

3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 49, at 151. On the one hand, this text cer
tainly shows a Founding-era use of "bear arms" that, consistent with the Libertarian Ap
proach, includes both military and non-military meanings. On the other hand, the
Pennsylvania Minority's proposed right to bear arms "for the purpose of killing game" is
unlike every state constitution of its time and every other state proposal for amending the
federal Constitution - and most important, it was rejected by the drafters of the Second
Amendment. Indeed, the differences between the Pennsylvania proposal and the Second
Amendment argue strongly against the Libertarian Approach. In the first place, the fact that
the Pennsylvania Minority felt the need to specify the reach of their proposal suggests that
"killing game" would not otherwise have been considered material to the right to bear arms.
Second, the Pennsylvania proposal would have prohibited disarming either "the people" or
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the Second Amendment was adopted, the overwhelmingly dominant
meaning of the phrase "bear arms", particularly in a political context,
was to refer to the use of weapons by soldiers or militiamen. At the
very least, the extensive evidence for a military reading of "bear
Arms" means that the Libertarian Approach is not compelled simply
by the Founders' use of that phrase. And once the "plain text" argu
ment is gone, the game is up for the Libertarian Approach. For even if
the textual evidence were equivocal, with the military and non
military readings of "bear Arms" both being equally plausible (and
again, the evidence for a military reading is far stronger), the Second
Amendment's "purpose clause" and the legislative history detailed in
Part I would make the Libertarian Approach indefensible. The goal of
those who framed the Second Amendment was to protect a federalist
(lowercase "f" - the opposite of "national") military structure, in
which the militia occupied a central position.
C.

The Revisionists' Best Shot: The "Unorganized Militia Approach "

But the revisionists' repertoire is not limited to the implausible
Libertarian Approach. They also propose another justification for a
broad right of firearm ownership. This strand of the revisionist argu
ment accepts that the purpose of the Second Amendment was to pro
tect the states' ability to maintain organized militia, but holds that in
order for states to have this ability, they must have available an armed
populace (or as the revisionists prefer, an "unorganized militia"). Ac
cordingly, in this view, any (federal) law that (materially) denies the
states access to an armed populace violates the Second Amendment
(or at least burdens a protected constitutional interest - leave aside
for the moment what sorts of government interests might justify such
burdening).131 I will call this the "Unorganized Militia Approach."132
"any of them"; by contrast, the Second Amendment speaks only of "the people" in their
collective capacity as militiamen.
Moreover, historian Saul Cornell argues that the Pennsylvanians themselves had a con
siderably more complex understanding of the right to bear arms than the libertarian reading
of the Minority Report would suggest. See Cornell, supra note 3, at 227-30. In 1776,
Pennsylvania adopted a state constitution providing that "people have a right to bear arms
for the defense of themselves and the State." Id. at 228. The following year, the state legisla
ture enacted legislation known as the Test Acts which limited that right only to those citizens
who took a loyalty oath, which "as much as forty percent of the citizenry" refused to do. Id.
Even for Pennsylvanians, then, "[g]un ownership was based on the idea that one agreed to
support the state and to defend it against those who might use arms against it." Id. at 229.
131. The parentheticals are intended to suggest that, were courts to adopt the revision
ists' Unorganized Militia Approach, many crucial and difficult issues would remain to be
fleshed out - which is not to say, of course, that courts will always recognize this task and
attempt to tackle it. In Emerson, for example, the Court leapt from its determination that
Timothy Emerson's desire to possess a ·weapon was a cognizable Second Amendment inter
est to its conclusion that the statute at issue was unconstitutional, without pausing to con
sider whether the government's interest in preventing domestic violence justified the statute.
See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
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While the Second Amendment right envisioned by the Unorgan
ized Militia Approach may not be so broad as that envisioned by the
Libertarian Approach, the Unorganized Militia Approach is still "re
visionist" because it contrasts sharply with the approach dominant in
modern Second Amendment cases. The courts' approach - call it the
"Organized Militia Approach" - sees the purpose of the Second
Amendment as "protect[ing] only the possession or use of weapons
that is reasonably related to a militia actively maintained and trained
by the states."1 33 The effect of the courts' approach is to limit the Sec
ond Amendment to preventing federal interference with state Na
tional Guard units.134
These two approaches - the revisionists' Unorganized Militia
Approach and the courts' Organized Militia Approach - certainly
have very different consequences for gun control legislation. Consider,
for example, the federal statutes banning machine guns135 and military
style "assault weapons."136 These laws certainly interfere with states'
access to a populace armed for military service, and would presumably
be unconstitutional under the revisionists' Unorganized Militia Ap
proach.137 Because these statutes permit possession of the regulated
132. While the revisionists' rhetoric often sounds like it is supporting a Libertarian Ap
proach, many revisionists carefully avoid this pitfall and adopt the Unorganized Militia Ap
proach. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 3; Van Alstyne, supra note 3.
133. See United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added);
see also cases cited supra note 2. While I refer to the Organized Militia Approach as the
"courts' approach," it should be noted that modern Second Amendment doctrine has been
elaborated largely by the federal Courts of Appeal; the Supreme Court has said very little
about the Amendment. See David Yassky, The Sound of Silence: The Supreme Court and the
Second Amendment, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 189 (1999); see also infra Section IV.C.
134. The National Guard is a set of reserve military forces attached to both the federal
government and the states. The basic structure of the modern National Guard was estab
lished by the Dick Act of 1903, ch. 196, Stat. 775 (1903). This statute provided federal fund
ing and training for states' militia units; units funded and trained under the Act were de
nominated the "National Guard" and defined as the "organized militia." Statutes
subsequent to the Dick Act have placed the National Guard under ever-greater federal con
trol. Currently, anyone enlisting in a National Guard unit is automatically also enlisted into a
"reserve" unit of the U.S. Army (or Air Force), the federal government may use National
Guard units for a variety of purposes, and the federal government appoints the commanding
officers for these units. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301 (1994) (federal authority to transfer Guard
members to "active duty"); id. at §§ 12201-12215 (command structure of National Guard);
Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 345-46 (1989) (describing "dual enlistment" system).
The federal government also provides "virtually all of the funding" for the National Guard.
Perpich, 496 U.S. at 351. Today, each state has a branch of the National Guard, with a total
strength of approximately 450,000 members. See Bob Haskell, Educating Executives, ON
GUARD (April 2000), available at http://ngb.dtic.mil/news_center/onguard/2000/april/
executives.html. No state maintains any other organized militia. See generally MAHON, supra
note 32 (describing the exclusive role of the National Guard today).
135. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1994). The statute does permit private possession of ma
chine guns under certain limited circumstances; the effect, however, is a near-total ban.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 922(v), app. A (1994).
137. Maybe not though - no right is absolute, and the revisionists typically avoid giving
examples of actual statutes that they contend are unconstitutional.
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weapons by National Guard members,138 however, they are acceptable
under the Organized Militia Approach - and courts have uniformly
upheld them. In several cases, defendants convicted of machine gun
possession have specifically argued that under the Second Amend
ment their membership in an "unorganized militia"139 (or a "sedentary
militia,"140 an "organized private militia,"141 or the "Posse Comitatus, a
militia-type organization"142) entitles them to possess military weap
ons. Courts have consistently rejected these arguments.143 Courts' re
jection of the Unorganized Militia Approach is all the more striking
considering that many states have on their books statutes expressly
recognizing an "unorganized militia," typically consisting of all "able
bodied male citizens" within a specified age range.144 Even when
courts are made aware of these laws, they have insisted that the Sec
ond Amendment protects gun possession only when related to "the
actual, as opposed to potential, organization, training and equipping of
the unorganized militia."145
The Unorganized Militia Approach, then, is clearly at odds with
Second Amendment case law. But unlike the Libertarian Approach,
this strand of revisionism does have considerable support in the Sec
ond Amendment's text and legislative history. While the revisionists'
reading of "bear Arms" in the Amendment may be anachronistic,
their reading of "Militia" is more solidly grounded; the text of the
Amendment does identify the "Militia" (used in the first half of the
Amendment) with "the People . . . bear[ing] Arms" (in the second
half). As we have seen, in practice Founding-era militias were far from
universal, but in the Founders' conceptual framework the militia con
sisted of the mass of ordinary citizens, trained to arms and available to
serve at the call of the state. As George Mason put it: "Who are the
militia? They consist now of the whole people, except [for] a few pub138. 26 u.s.c. §§ 5844(1), 5853.
139. Wright, 117 F.3d at 1272.
140. United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976).
141 . United States v. Kuehnoel, No. 97-30189, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16373, at *6 (9th
Cir. July 12, 1999).
142. United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977).
143. Kuehnoel, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16373; United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); United States v . Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir.
1992); Oakes, 564 F.2d at 387; Warin, 530 F.2d at 103.
144. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3(d) (1995) (defining state's "unorganized militia"
as "all able-bodied male residents of the state between the ages of seventeen and forty-five
[with certain exceptions]"); KAN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (defining state's militia as "all able
bodied male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five [with certain excep
tions]").
145. See United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1274 (11 " Cir. 1997); see also Oakes, 564
F.2d at 387 (refusing to find Second Amendment violation "merely because [the defendant]
is technically a member of the Kansas militia").
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lie officers."146 When the Second Congress sought to exercise its con
stitutional. authority to "provide for organizing, arming and disciplin
ing the Militia," it directed "each and every free able-bodied white
male citizen of the respective states [except for persons exempted un
der state law and certain other exempted classes] . . . who is . . . of the
age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years" to enroll
in the militia of their states.147 Or as Patrick Henry declared at the Vir
ginia ratifying convention: "The great object is, that every man be
armed. "148
Today's National Guard is thus a far cry from what the Founders'
understood a militia to be.149 Indeed, the Founders' did have a concept
that approximates today's National Guard - but it was a concept they
disapproved. This is the "select militia" - a specially trained part of
the citizenry. To the Founders, a select militia was little better than an
army. The Philadelphia Convention explicitly rejected a proposal to
create a "select militia" for the federal govemment,150 as did the Third
Congress.151 The Constitution's proponents, moreover, repeatedly de
nied Anti-Federalist charges that Congress' power to "provide for
training" the militia would lead to creation of a select militia.152 Imag
ine, then, that in 1792 the Second Congress had enacted a statute pro
hibiting possession of the most commonly used military weapon of the
day, except among members of the army and a small "select militia"
- a statute roughly analogous to the machine gun ban of today. It is
hard to believe that even the most nationalist of the Federalists would
have thought such a statute consistent with the Second Amendment.153

146. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 425.
147. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 271, 271. The Act did exempt federal officials
from militia service, along with customhouse officers, post officers and stage drivers, ferry
men, pilots, mariners, and any persons exempted by the laws of the respective states.
148. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 386. I use this quotation advisedly. Henry
was among the most determined and impassioned Anti-Federalist opponents of the Consti
tution, and this quotation is in fact from a speech arguing against ratification. As Henry's
intentions for the new nation were plainly not shared by those who framed and ratified the
Constitution, I want to avoid the trap of relying on him as a reliable indicator of the Found
ers' world-view. That is precisely the trap fallen into by some revisionists, who build their
entire arguments around quotations from Anti-Federalists. See, e.g. , HALBROOK, supra note
3. On the specific issue of the composition of the militia, however, Henry's views are exem
plary.
149. I briefly describe the National Guard at supra note 134.
150. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 48, at 330-33.
151. See Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1493,
1537-38 (1969).
152. See 3 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 425-26 (statement of George Mason).
153. Of course, the actual response of a Federalist to such a proposal would have been
that Congress lacked power to enact such a ban under Article I, Section 8. In Federalist No.
84, Alexander Hamilton famously argued that the enumeration of powers obviated a bill of
rights - that the Constitution gave the federal government no power to regulate, for exam-
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"Translating" the Second A mendment

It does not necessarily follow, however, that a judge today should
find a machine gun ban inconsistent with the Second Amendment. As
Lawrence Lessig reminds us, remaining faithful to the Founders' in
tent sometimes requires judges to modify the application of constitu
tional text over time.154 Lessig uses the metaphor of "translation" to
describe this process. Just as a literal translation of a foreign text can
actually distort its original meaning, so too can a literal application of
constitutional text subvert the Founders' intent; just as a translator's
creation of a new text can be an act of fidelity, so too can a judge act
faithfully in expressing Founding ideals through new doctrine - even
new doctrine that is directly at odds with old doctrine. In Lessig's for
mulation, "translation" is appropriate, even necessary, whenever con
stitutional "presuppositions" - which he defines as contextual facts
upon which the phrasing of the document was contingent - change.155
Perhaps it is possible, then, to justify modern courts' narrow read
ing of the Second Amendment as an instance of valid translation.156
While the courts themselves have not framed their analysis in this way
- . unsurprisingly, courts have presented modern doctrine as a
straightforward implementation of the Founders' intent - at least two
scholars, Dennis Henigan and Keith Ehrman, have attempted a
Lessig-like defense of the courts.157 This defense begins with the obpie, speech or worship. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Hamilton). The same argument would
presumably apply to firearm ownership.
154. See Lessig, Fidelity as Translation, supra note 26; Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, su
pra note 26; Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 26.
155. Or in Lessig's words: presuppositions are those elements of a context "relied upon
by the author . . . in just the sense that had they been other than they were when the author
first used these words, then the author would have used words other than she did." Lessig,
Fidelity in Translation, supra note 26, at 1 179-80. And: "If between two contexts a presuppo
sition has changed . . . [then] the reader must accommodate for this changed presupposition
if she is to be faithful to the text's original meaning." Id. at 1180-81.
156. Lessig himself cites the Second Amendment as a possible candidate for translation
- although he appears to believe that translating the Amendment would yield a result
similar to the revisionists' Unorganized Militia Approach, rather than supporting the courts.
See id. at 1204-05. The few lines he devotes to the Amendment, however, are more in the
nature of a tentative suggestion than a full-blown argument.
157. See Henigan, supra note 3; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 3. Henigan and Ehrman
neither use Lessig's terminology nor rely upon his work; nonetheless, I think their argument
is a good example of what Lessig has in mind by "translation."
More recently, Richard Uviller and William Merkel have argued, at length and with
great sophistication, that developments in military structure since the Founding have drained
the Second Amendment of much if not all of its original force. See Uviller & Merkel, supra
note 3. While I received a copy of their article too late to include discussion of it in the text
above, I believe my analysis of the Henigan-Ehrman argument applies also to that of Uviller
and Merkel.
The other leading scholars who have criticized the revisionists are David Williams and
Carl Bogus. See Bogus, The Hidden History ofthe Second Amendment, supra note 3; Bogus,
Race, Riots, and Guns, supra note 3; Williams, Conjuring with the People, supra note 3;
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servation that the nature and structure of the American militia have
changed radically since the Founders' day. Henigan and Ehrman
summarize the "key developments in the history of the militia" as "the
split between an organized and unorganized militia; the passage of the
militias from state authority to largely federal authority; and the rise
of the army as the main defense force in the country."158
The end result of these changes is the disappearance of anything
the Founders would have recognized as a militia. Today we have the
National Guard (which, as the revisionists correctly observe, the
Founders would have seen as little better than a standing army), and
we have self-proclaimed "citizen militias" constituted wholly inde
pendently of any government - and mostly, of course, we have the
vast bulk of citizens who have no involvement whatever with any form
of military organization.159
These developments certainly constitute a change in "presupposi
tion" as Lessig uses the term. To the Founders, protecting gun owner
ship by "the people" amounted to more or less the same thing as pro
tecting gun ownership by the "Militia." Now the two are quite
different.
Henigan and Ehrman argue that this change justifies a translation.
They correctly perceive that modern interpreters of the Amendment
are presented with a choice that did not exist in 1791 - a choice be
tween protecting "the people" and protecting the "Militia." Their
claim, in essence, is that the latter alternative is more consistent with
the Founders' intentions - that if the Founders had anticipated the
developments of the following two centuries, they would have made
clear their desire only to protect the "Militia."
This argument is stronger than it may first appear. As David
Williams has convincingly shown, the ideology underlying the Second
Amendment was deeply republican - to an extent that is easy to miss
because modern Americans simply don't share many of the Founders'
republican assumptions and beliefs.160 The average citizen whom the
Founders wished to see armed was a man of republican virtue - a
Williams, The Terrifying Second Amendment, supra note 3. Like Henigan-Ehrman and
Uviller-Merkel, Williams believes that changed circumstances since the Founding require a
"translation" of the Amendment; unlike them, however, he does not think the courts' ap
proach is adequate. Bogus' main tack is not to propose a translation, but rather to dispute
the revisionists' history.
158. Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 3, at 39. These developments, and the entire his
tory of the militia, are described well in MAHON, supra note 32.
159. The transformation can be dated to the 1903 Dick Act. See supra note 134. My ar
gument in the next Part will be that a statute like the Dick Act was possible only after the
Civil War.
160. Williams, Conjuring with the People, supra note 3; Williams, The Terrifying Second
Amendment, supra note 3; see also Bailyn, supra note 1 10; Pocock, supra note 1 10; Wood,
supra note 110.
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man shaped by his myriad ties to his community, the most important
for this purpose being the militia. As Williams puts it: "The militia was
a precondition for the right to arms. Without a militia the right is
meaningless."161 Thus "the people" spoken of in the Amendment were
not simply all citizens (or even all adult males); rather, "the people"
were assured access to arms in their role as a "well regulated Militia."
This role, moreover, was created and defined by the state. A group
of men did not become a "militia" until they were organized by the
state to serve the common defense.162 John Adams expressed the dis
tinction between arms-bearer-as-individual and arms-bearer-as
militiaman:
To suppose arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discre
tion, except in private self-defense, or by partial orders of towns, counties
or districts of a state, is to demolish every constitution, and lay the laws
prostrate, so that liberty can be enjoyed by no man; it is a dissolution of
the government. The fundamental law of the militia is, that it be created,
directed, and commanded by the laws, and ever for the support of the
laws. 1 63

This understanding of the militia was written into the Constitution,
which specifically granted to states the authority to "Appoint[] . . . the
Officers" of their militia; individual citizens could not deem them
selves militiamen.164 The text of the Second Amendment itself disal
lows any equation between the militia and all American citizens in
their individual capacities. The Amendment does not use the simple
word "Militia," but the phrase "well regulated Militia."
The ideology of the militia expressed by John Adams was also
borne out by the Founders' practice. In 1787, four states sent their mi
litia to quell Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts. The framers of the
Second Amendment did not see Daniel Shays and his followers as
"militia" - they were insurrectionaries pursuing a private interest
(debt relief) and had no claim to public protection.165 Similarly, seven
161. Williams, The Terrifying Second Amendment, supra note 3, at 555.
162. See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 47, at 424 ("If we are, then, to govern the mi
litia, it must be such men as the particular states have declared to be militia.") (statement of
Rep. Williamson), see also Marguerite Driessen, Private Organizations and the Militia Status,
1 998 BYU L. REV. 1 , 7 ("[L]egitimate militias were organized by the State. Being a member
of a militia was not something an individual conferred upon himself.").
163. John Adams, Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States, in
6 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 197 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851).
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
165. See generally DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS REBELLION (1980). Thomas Jefferson
is the exception that proves the rule. In a letter to William Smith (the letter containing the
famous quotation "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of
patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure."), Jefferson criticized the Philadelphia dele
gates ("Our Convention has been too much impressed by the insurrection in
Massachusetts") and praised Shays' rebels ("[C]an history produce an instance of rebellion
so honorably conducted?"). See Alpheus Thomas Mason, ed., FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE
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years later the Whiskey Rebellion was attacked by both leading Fed
eralists and former Anti-Federalists.166 No one in 1794 would have
suggested that rebellious Pennsylvania farmers were a "militia" pro
tected by the Second Amendment; there is no evidence that even the
rebels themselves invoked the Second Amendment.167
As these episodes make clear, those who framed and ratified the
Second Amendment were seeking not to enshrine some generalized
right of Americans to revolt against government, nor to empower in
dividuals or small groups of disaffected citizens to take up arms
against the established order. Rather, they sought to protect a specific
set of institutions - organized, state-based militia - that they saw as
playing a crucial, liberty-protecting role in their new government
structure. Outside of the National Guard, these institutions no longer
exist.
At the core of Henigan and Ehrman's (and the courts) position,
then, is an important and correct insight: Given the disappearance of a
universal-service citizen-militia, simply mimicking the Founders' Sec
ond Amendment doctrine (or, more precisely, mimicking the doctrine
Founding-era courts would have developed if necessary) no longer
serves the Founders' purposes. Today, recognizing a broad constitu
tional right to gun ownership cannot plausibly be seen as empowering
the states to resist aggression by the national government, or as en
suring a decentralized alternative to a national standing army. Moreo
ver, considering the Founders' republican assumptions, widespread
arms ownership would have looked very different to the Founders had
militia service not been equally widespread - more like arming the
mob than like arming "the people." Thus the revisionists' Unorgan
ized Militia Approach is, at best, an imperfect "translation" of the
Founders' intent.
So far, so good for Henigan and Ehrman. The problem is, how
ever, that proving the revisionists wrong doesn't mean the courts are
right. If the revisionists lose a good deal in their translation of the Sec
ond Amendment, the courts' approach - translating both "Militia"
and "the people" as "the National Guard" - loses even more. After
all, what modern Second Amendment doctrine really represents is not
an effort to implement the Founders' world-view but a capitulation to
the complete obsolescence of that world-view. The Founders' effort to
craft a division of military power between the national army and the
states' militia has failed utterly - but that does not justify pretending
that such a division was not the Founders' purpose. Truly remaining
MAKING 247 (2d ed. 1956) (reprinting letter dated Nov. 13, 1787, from Thomas Jefferson to
William Smith).
166. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 190-204; Saul Cornell, supra note 3.
167. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact, supra note 3, at 256.
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faithful to that purpose would require neither a scaling back of the
Second Amendment so that it protects only the National Guard, nor
an extension of it to protect private gun ownership, but rather a fron
tal assault on the agglomeration of national military power that the
Founders were determined to prevent.
The example of the Second Amendment thus reveals a significant
.
weakness in the notion of interpretation-as-translation: What happens
when a change in a "presupposition" necessarily involves repudiation
of one of the Founders' core value judgments?168 In that situation, any
"translation" that accommodates the change in presupposition will in
evitably break faith with a Founding commitment of principle. That is
precisely the dilemma presented by the Second Amendment. The
principle of military decentralization - the avoidance of standing ar
mies - was a cornerstone of the Founders' political theory; yet nei
ther the courts' doctrine nor the revisionist alternative respect this
principle. An interpretive practice based on "translation" may work
well for technological changes such as the advent of broadcast media
(in the First Amendment area) or electronic surveillance (in the
Fourth Amendment area), but when a change in presupposition is
brought about by deliberate, political choice at odds with the Found
ers' design - here, the creation of a wholly nationalized military at
the expense of states' militia - then that change cannot simply be
taken as a given. Before modern Second Amendment doctrine can be
justified as a legitimate interpretive response to the withering of the
states' militia, that change itself must be explained and defended. I at
tempt such a defense in the following Part.
III.

DISMANTLING THE FOUNDERS' FRAMEWORK

My defense of the courts' doctrine hinges on the Fourteenth
Amendment. The argument is that the Fourteenth Amendment
should be read to abrogate the constitutional commitment to preserva
tion of the states' militia. With this change, the original underpinnings
of the Second Amendment disintegrated, justifying modern courts' ex
tremely narrow reading of the Amendment. Modern statutes such as
those banning private possession of machine guns and assault weapons
are therefore perfectly valid, even though analogous laws in 1800
would have been plainly unconstitutional - not because we read the
168. Lessig anticipates this problem by defining a category of "political presuppositions"
which reflect value judgments rather than factual beliefs. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,
supra note 26, at 1254-55. Constitutional interpreters should not, according to Lessig, credit
changes in such presuppositions. Id. This concession by Lessig eliminates a great deal of the
explanatory power of his theory. As the example of the Second Amendment illustrates,
most, if not all significant instances of doctrinal change in constitutional law are driven by
changes in "political presuppositions." The interpretive methodology I advocate here seeks
to identify those changes which are grounded in a constitutional amendment, and therefore
ought to be taken into account by contemporary interpreters.
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Constitution differently today, but because the Constitution has
changed in the interim.
To see the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the militia and therefore its impact on the Second Amendment - I will focus on
the changing constitutional status of a federal draft. In Part I, I briefly
described President Madison's proposal to draft soldiers for the War
of 1812. Opponents, led by Daniel Webster, maintained that the draft
was unconstitutional, and the proposal was defeated. I will argue be
low that Webster was correct. Madison's proposal was unconstitu
tional because national conscription would have destroyed the Found
ers' delicately balanced military system.
During the Civil War, however, President Lincoln succeeded
where Madison had failed. He pushed through the Conscription Act of
1863 and implemented a federal draft. The Supreme Court eventually
upheld the practice in the 1918 Selective Draft Law Cases.169
As with Madison's proposal, I believe the Conscription Act was
unconstitutional - when enacted. One ramification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, was to legitimize Lincoln's draft and his con
comitant repudiation of the militia. In this way, the draft resembled a
number of other Civil War innovations. For the Conscription Act was
hardly Lincoln's only constitutional transgression. He almost certainly
lacked authority to issue the Emancipation Proclamation;170 his impo
sition of an income tax was probably unconstitutional;171 his suspen
sion of habeas corpus was declared so by the Supreme Court;172 and
his issuance of paper money was constitutionally dubious at best.173
169. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
170. That is a large claim and I do not intend to defend it here. Suffice it to say that Lin
coln himself based his authority to issue the Proclamation entirely upon his status as Com
mander-in-Chief, writing privately that the Proclamation had no constitutional or legal justi
fication, except as a military measure. 8 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 32
(John G. Nicolay and John Hay eds. 1905). In his main public defense of the Proclamation,
Lincoln responded to charges of its unconstitutionality by stating: "I think differently. I think
the constitution invests its Commander-in-chief with the law of war, in time of war." DAvrn
HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 456 (1995) (quoting letter from Lincoln to James c.
Conkling). It is also worth noting that Lincoln's first effort at emancipation was to propose
constitutional amendments that were much less sweeping than his eventual Proclamation,
see id. at 396-97, and that Justice Curtis - who had dissented in Dred Scott and who by 1862
had retired from the Supreme Court - wrote a pamphlet contesting the Proclamation's con
stitutionality. ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, 2 A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE w AR
BETWEEN THE STATES 551-57 (Philadelphia, Nat'! Publ'g Co. 1870). See also JAMES G.
RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 373-78 (1926) (discussing Proc
lamation's constitutionality).
171. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (declaring 1894
income tax law unconstitutional) (nullified by Sixteenth Amendment).
172. See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
173. The wartime Legal Tender Act was initially declared unconstitutional in Hepburn
Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870), but the Court quickly reversed itself in the Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1871) (reversing Hepburn). I would argue that the holding in the Legal
Tender Cases depends mainly on the Civil War Amendments - but that argument will have
v.
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But of course we do not regard Abraham Lincoln as a rogue presi
dent. All readers of this Article understand that Lincoln and the Re
construction Congress which followed him were agents of a monumen
tal constitutional change. My argument here is that this change
embraced military structure as well as the more familiar issues of
equality and individual liberty. Just as the Thirteenth Amendment
ratified the Emancipation Proclamation, and the Fourteenth ratified
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, so too did the Fourteenth Amendment
legitimize conscription. Lincoln's repudiation of the militia system fit
perfectly with the larger principles for which the Civil War was fought.
After the military defeat of States' Rights proponents at the hands of
Unionists, the Founders' notion of militia as protection against na
tional despotism was no longer tenable. From the perspective of the
Unionists who wrote the Fourteenth Amendment, the Southern states'
militia were an instrument of, not a remedy for, tyranny. To the
Founding Federalists, the states' militia had symbolized freedom; to
the Reconstruction Republicans, the states' militia symbolized slavery
and rebellion. In this view, both Daniel Webster and the Selective
Draft Law Cases were correct - because the Constitution of 1918 was
not (and the Constitution of 2000 is not) the Constitution of 1812.
A. The Civil War Watershed
The decisive break with the Founders' principles took place during
the middle of the Civil War. In the early stages of the conflict,
President Lincoln drew on both of the options made available by the
Founders. He directed the Army to enlist as many volunteers as could
be found, while at the same time making repeated calls on the states
for militia.174 But these methods could not supply the enormous num
ber of soldiers needed to prosecute the war, as the number of volun
teers dwindled and states proved unable or unwilling to furnish the
number of militiamen called for by the president.175 In 1862, Lincoln
made his first, tentative break with the Founders' conception: He pro
posed, and Congress adopted, a statute authorizing the president to

to await another day. For criticisms of the Legal Tender Cases, see ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 155 (1990); Kenneth w.
Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 367 (1982); Peter B. McCutchen, Mis
takes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of
the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1 , 17 (1994).
174. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF THE REPUBLIC 322-26, 490-94;
MAHON, supra note 32, at 97-107; CHAMBERS II, supra note 32, at 42-49.
175. When Lincoln took office in 1860, the national army consisted of only 16,000 sol
diers. See MAHON, supra note 32, at 97; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 23 (1988). By 1862,
more than 700,000 men had joined the Union Army, MCPHERSON, supra note 174, at 322,
and during the course of the war some 2,100,000 soldiers would fight on the Union side, id.
at 306 n.41.
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compel states to draft a specified number of militiamen into service.176
Lincoln never used this authority, as the statute had its desired effect;
the states fulfilled their quotas. The next year, however, with the need
for fresh troops unabated, Lincoln was forced to make a more dra
matic proposal, the Conscription Act of 1863.177
Just as Webster and the Hartford Convention had fifty years ear
lier, Lincoln's opponents insisted conscription was unconstitutional.178
If the men of the United States need to be called to war, these oppo
nents argued, the proper way to do so is by calling out the militia. The
Conscription Act ignored this constitutional directive by drafting
Americans directly into the national army. In the face of the urgent
military necessity for conscription, however, these protestations were
to no avail. The opponents were denounced as copperheads, and the
bill passed overwhelmingly.179
Enacting the law was only half the battle; the next step was en
forcing it. In New York, Governor Horatio Seymour threatened to
block implementation of the Act. Seymour backed away from his
threat just before the Act took effect - but he warned that "the
bloody and treasonable doctrine of public necessity can be proclaimed
by a mob as well as by the government," and initial efforts to begin the
draft sparked four days of vicious rioting.180 It took a garrison of 20,000
federal soldiers to restore order and permit the draft to go forward.181
Matters went further in Pennsylvania. In an extraordinary pro
ceeding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took jurisdiction over a suit
by draftees challenging the Conscription Act, Kneedler v. Lane.182 By a
3-2 majority, the Court declared the Act unconstitutional and author
ized a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. Chief Justice
Lowrie termed the conscripted federal army "an unauthorized substi
tute for the militia of the states."183 A crisis was averted, however, af
ter elections in Pennsylvania enabled a change in the composition of

176. Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 597. See MCPHERSON, supra note 174, at 492-93;
MAHON, supra note 32, at 100-01.
177. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 . Incidentally, the Union's difficulties in
raising troops demonstrate James Madison's acuity in Federalist 46, in which he predicted
that state militias would far outnumber even the largest federal army that could be amassed
with volunteers. See supra note 63 and text accompanying note 204.
178. See infra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
179. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1391 (1863) (Senate approved Conscrip
tion Act by vote of 35-6); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1268-69 (1863) (use of "cop
perhead" epithet).
180. See MCPHERSON, supra note 174, at 609-1 1 .
181. See id. a t 611 .
182. 45 Pa. 238 (1863); see also J.L. Bernstein, Conscription and the Constitution: The
Amazing Case of Kneedler v. Lane, 53 AB.A. J. 708 (1967).
183. Kneedler, 45 Pa. at 245.
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the Pennsylvania Court. Chief Justice Lowrie's term expired shortly
after the Kneedler decision, and Governor Andrew Curtin, a staunch
Lincoln ally who had just won reelection, appointed a Republican to
replace him - thus tipping the balance of the Court in favor of the
President.184 The Court met immediately to dissolve the injunction;
this time, the 3-2 vote went in favor of Lincoln and the draft.185 En
forcement of the Conscription Act went forward.
Chief Justice Taney apparently expected a suit similar to Kneedler
to reach the United States Supreme Court; in anticipation, he pre
pared a draft opinion finding the Conscription Act unconstitutional.186
But the suit never came, and it was not until the Selective Draft Law
Cases187 in 1918 that the Supreme Court finally ruled on the issue (al
though the Supreme Court made passing references to conscription,
without suggesting any disapproval, as early as 1865188). The issue in
that case was the validity of a draft law enacted during World War I.
The plaintiffs, echoing Daniel Webster and the Pennsylvania Justices,
argued that the draft law "infringe[d] . . . [the] reserved right of the
States over the militia. "189 Rejecting that argument, a unanimous
Court upheld the law.190

184. See Bernstein, supra note 182, at 712 In winning reelection, Curtin defeated a chal
lenge by none other than Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice George Woodward, who had
engineered that court's unusual proceeding in Kneedler. This election, along with those tak
ing place simultaneously in other states, was understood nationwide as a crucial referendum
on Lincoln's leadership and his prosecution of the war. "A prominent Democrat campaign
ing for Woodward declared that when elected he would unite with Governors Vallandigham
of Ohio and Seymour of New York (representing together nearly half of the North's popula
tion) 'in calling from the army troops from their respective States for the purpose of com
pelling the Administration to invite a convention of the States to adjust our difficulties.' "
MCPHERSON, supra note 174, at 685; see also DONALD, supra note 170, at 454-55.
185. Kneedler, 45 Pa. at 238.
186. See Roger B. Taney, Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the United States, in THE
MILITARY DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION 208 (Martin Anderson ed.,
1982).
187. The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
1 88. See United States v. Murphy, 70 U.S. 649 (1865); United States v. Scott, 70 U.S. 642
(1865). Also, Tarble's Case, in 1872, contains dicta explicitly approving the federal draft:
"Now, among the powers assigned to the National government, is the power 'to raise and
support armies' . . . . [I]ts control over the subject is plenary and exclusive. It can determine,
without question from any State authority, how the armies shall be raised, whether by volun
tary enlistment or forced draft . . ." 80 U.S. 397, 408 (1872). This observation is made in
passing, without any supporting argument.
.

189. 245 U.S. at 372 (Court's summary of party arguments).
190. Id. at 382 ("The fallacy of the argument results from confounding the constitutional
provisions concerning the militia with that conferring upon Congress the power to raise ar
mies. It treats them as one while they are different.").
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The Original Understanding of Conscription

Today, more than eighty years after the Selective Draft Law Cases
and with the constitutionality of the draft well-established, the argu
ments against conscription may strike some readers as implausible.
Yet as a matter of original intent, Lincoln's opponents were almost
certainly correct. The Conscription Act was inconsistent with the
Founders' Constitution. It made nonsense of the carefully crafted Mi
litia Clauses of Article I, and of the Second Amendment designed to
protect and implement them. Every indicator of original intent - text,
legislative history, contemporary practice and constitutional structure
- argues against a national draft.191
1.

Text

Proponents of the Conscription Act based their constitutional ar
gument on the clause authorizing Congress to "raise and support Ar
mies, "192 together with the Necessary and Proper Clause.193 Their ar
gument was straightforward: Because the federal government is
permitted to maintain an army, it must be allowed to conscript soldiers
to staff that army. Or as the court later put it in the Selective Draft
Law Cases: "As the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to
compose it, on the face of the Constitution the objection that it does
not give power to provide for such men would seem to be too frivolous
for further notice. "194
But the question is not whether Congress may provide for such
"men" at all - that separate question was indeed settled by the Foun
ders after the extensive debate recounted in Part I - but how Con
gress may provide for them. The answer is that the Founders envi
sioned that any federal army would be "raise[d]" the way "Armies"
were always raised at that time: by voluntary enlistment. As we saw
earlier, the dichotomy between armies and the militia was central to
the Founders' thought - and this dichotomy was enshrined in the
constitutional text. The federal government was authorized to
"raise . . . Armies"195 at will, but permitted to "call[] forth the Mili
tia"1% only under certain specified conditions. By contrast, states were
191. Other scholars have dealt with this issue more comprehensively than I do here,
with the same conclusion. See Harrop A. Freeman, The Constitutionality of Direct Federal
Military Conscription, 46 IND. L.J. 333 (1971); Friedman, supra note 151; see also AMAR,
supra note 9, at 56-59. As the dates of the Friedman (1969) and Freeman articles suggest,
debate over the draft's constitutionality revived during the Vietnam War.
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
194. 245 U.S. at 377.
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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expressly forbidden to "keep Troops [a synonym for armies] . . . in
time of Peace,"197 but they were expected to maintain and "train[] the
Militia"198 continually.
This army/militia dichotomy had several dimensions, but for pres
ent purposes the key distinction was that army service was voluntary
but militia service was compulsory. As Taney's never-used draft
opinion describes, this distinction was part of the very meaning of the
terms:
The power to do this [i.e., conscript] is, I understand, claimed under
the clause which gives Congress the power to raise and support ar
mies . . . . But . . . the words themselves, even if they stood alone, will not,
according to their known and established use and meaning in the English
language, justify [this construction].
During the period when the United States were English Colonies, the
Army of England, - the standing army, - was always raised by volun
tary enlistments . . . and when the power to raise and support armies was
delegated to Congress, the words of the grant necessarily implied that
they were to be raised in the usual manner. - And the general govern
ment has always heretofore so understood them and has uniformly by its
own officers recruited the ranks of its "land forces" by voluntary enlist
ments for a specified period.1 99

The distinction between an enlisted army and a conscripted militia
was also built into the architecture of the Constitution's military provi
sions, as opponents of the Conscription Act saw clearly. During de
bate on the Act, Senator James Bayard of Delaware led his colleagues
through a careful and detailed examination of the military clauses,
concluding: "If the power of Congress exists to call the entire able
bodied population of the United States into the standing regular Army
of the United States by conscription, what is there left, and where was
the necessity for these provisions as to the organization of the mili
tia?"200 Giving Congress the power to conscript, Bayard argued, would
obviate its powers to call forth the militia201 and to prescribe a training
"discipline" for them,202 and would nullify the Founders' carefully
crafted limits on those powers. One of the Kneedler Justices put it suc
cinctly: "[I]f we concede this dangerous power to the language of the
13th [Raise Armies] clause, we destroy the force and effect of the
words of the 16th and 17th [Militia] clauses."203

197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
199. Taney, supra note 186, at 213.
200. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1364 (1863) (statement of Sen. Bayard).
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
203. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238, 257 (1863) (Woodward, J., concurring).
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Legislative History

The ratification debates confirm that this was not the Founders' in
tent. Recall, for example, Madison's confidence in the passage quoted
earlier from The Federalist No. 46 that in the event of any attempted
coup by federal officials, the militia - "near half a million of citizens"
- would easily defeat an army that, at most, would number "twenty
five or thirty thousand men."204 Behind Madison's arithmetic is the
premise that the national government will be forced to rely on enlist
ees for its army - and that only a tiny fraction of the population will
voluntarily sign up to fight - while the states can conscript their en
tire male citizenry.
Recall, too, Anti-Federalist fears that the federal government
would "harass" and "abuse" militiamen by marching them from
Maryland to Maine and subjecting them to harsh military law. These
charges were directed at the constitutional language authorizing Con
gress to call forth the militia, and to prescribe a "discipline" for train
ing the militia, powers that the Philadelphia delegates had carefully
limited in duration and scope. The outcry would have been orders of
magnitude louder had any among the Founders believed the federal
government could conscript soldiers directly, at any time and for any
reason. Leon Friedman puts this point more broadly: "Further evi
dence that none of the founders thought power had been granted to
conscript into a federal army is the fact that even the most vociferous
Antifederalists never raised this spectre in attacking the new Constitu
tion. "205
Indeed, the rhetoric of Lincoln's opponents often bore a striking
resemblance to Anti-Federalist speeches in defense of the militia.
Thus Representative S.S. Cox complained: "By this bill you leave no
power in the States to officer or direct their militia. The troops of
Ohio may be mingled miscellaneously with those from Maine."206
Similarly, the Kneedler opinion echoed the Founders' vision: "Under
the militia system, every man goes out with his neighbors and friends,
and under officers with whom he is acquainted."207 The Conscription
Act was wholly inconsistent with that vision.

204. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
205. Friedman, supra note 151, at 1525. Friedman thus concludes, "The idea of a direct
draft by a central government acting upon every citizen without the intervening authority of
the state governments was firmly and totally rejected even at the darkest moments of the
Revolution." Id. at 1510.
206. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1269 (1863) (statement of Rep. Cox).
207. 45 Pa. at 248-49.
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Contemporary Practice

Besides text and history, Founding-era practice argues against the
draft. Prior to 1863, the federal government had mobilized military
forces only through the two methods envisioned by the Constitution:
voluntary enlistment and calling forth the states' militia. The one ef
fort to depart from this practice - Madison's proposed draft in 1815
was firmly rejected.208 Thus as Senator Bayard charged, the Con
scription Act broke sharply with precedent: "For the first time in the
history of this country, the bill proposes, by conscription . . . to force
every able-bodied citizen of the United States, capable of enduring the
fatigues of war, into the Army of the United States, the regular
standing Army of the United States."209
-

4.

Constitutional Structure

Most important, as we saw in Part I, the constitutional text and the
Founders' practice were undergirded by a principled commitment to a
(partially) decentralized military structure, with power divided be
tween a federal army and the states' militia. The single strongest ar
gument against the Conscription Act was that it undercut this com
mitment entirely. Lincoln's opponents declared repeatedly that
conscription "obliterates the militia system . . . and substitutes in place
of that system, standing armies."210
The essential vice of the Conscription Act was that it ignored the
constitutional mandate putting the militia under the control of the
states. "[I]t takes that very state force, strips it of its officers, despoils it
of its organization, and reconstructs its elements under a different
authority."211 This invited precisely the dangers the Federalists had
struggled to avoid: tyranny and military adventurism. Senator David
Turpie, an Indiana Democrat, detailed how, throughout the nation's
seventy-year history, the states had played a vital, intermediary role in
checking federal power:

208. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
209. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1363 (1863) (statement of Sen. Bayard); see
also id. at 1363-64 ("[The bill] does not propose that Congress shall act under that provision
of the Federal Constitution which authorizes the . . . calling [of] the militia of the several
States into active service . . . . The bill has no such object . . . . [The bill] utterly abandons and
subverts the militia system of the United States . . . and substitutes in place of that system
standing armies."); Kneedler, 45 Pa. at 272 ("During the Whiskey Insurrection in this state,
President Washington called upon the militia [to suppress the rebellion], by a requisition on
the governor, and in person commanded them. So the militia were called out from many of
the states during the war with Great Britain, and in every instance a requisition made by the
President upon the governors of the states.").
210. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1364 (1863) (statement of Sen. Bayard).
211. Kneedler, 45 Pa. at 245.
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Here is a plain attempt to obliterate one step which has always hereto
fore been observed and regarded; a step that has always been taken in
calling into the field the military forces of the Republic. It belongs to his
tory that armies heretofore have been raised by requisitions of the Ex
ecutive upon the authorities of the States. . . .
In the War of 1812, . . . [Massachusetts] refused to furnish her quota for
carrying on that war. In the war with Mexico, some of the New England
States also refused and declined . . . .
In this war, the authorities of Kentucky and Massachusetts refused and
declined to obey the requisition of the President of the United States,
and so did the authorities of other States. . . .
It is a part of the constitutional law of the country that a requisition must
be made on the State authorities by the national Executive for military
forces within the control of the States. Senators talk about the militia of
the United States. There is no such thing in existence. The militia belongs
to the States.212

At bottom, then, the infirmity of the Conscription Act lay in its re
pudiation of the military checks-and-balances designed by the Found
ers. In the words of Representative Cox:
I believe that this bill not only subverts the State governments, but that it
will oppress the people. It breaks down the barrier which the people
erected against consolidated power; for never in the history of this or any
other Government has such a stupendous power been reposed in one
man as the power reposed by this bill in the President of the United
States.213

C.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Legitimation ofthe Draft

But once we understand the ways in which conscription broke with
the Founders' plan, we can begin to see why the Fourteenth Amend
ment must be understood to legitimize the draft. Imagine how the
Founders' concerns about federal tyranny and military adventurism
must have seemed to Lincoln and the Reconstruction Republicans.
First, and most obviously, the Founders' main fear - that a President
might use a national standing army to impose his will on dissident
states - was moot. Their plan had failed. The Civil War - or, to
212. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1367 (1863) (statement of Sen. Turpie). Senator James Bayard elaborated the point further:
Heretofore it has been always held that the reserved force of the nation is the militia of the
several States, which can be called into its service by the President of the United States un
der the provisions that Congress may adopt for that purpose; but when you call that militia
into service, you call them in, not as individuals, but as organized bodies of men, to be com
manded, under the express provision of the Constitution, by officers appointed by the States,
and to be disciplined under the discipline that Congress prescribes, by the State authorities
alone . . . .

Id. at 1363 (statement of Sen. Bayard).
213. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1270 (1863) (statement of Rep. Cox).
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paraphrase Confederate terminology, the War Between Some of the
States and the Federal Government - was precisely the eventuality
the Founders' structure was designed to prevent.
Even more fundamentally, from the vantage point of Civil War
Unionists, not only was the Founders' plan obsolete, but its premises
were mistaken. By 1866, it was simply no longer possible to view the
states and their militias as the Founders had. To the Founders, the
states were bulwarks of liberty; to the Republicans, the (southern)
states were defenders of slavery, and their militias, the Confederate
Army, had killed some 360,000 Union soldiers in that cause.214 The
political-theory foundation of the Militia Clauses and the Second
Amendment had turned to dust.
It is with this perspective that we should read the Fourteenth
Amendment as having retroactively ratified Lincoln's military innova
tions. The Amendment does not, of course, expressly mention the
draft, or even the militia or the army. It did not repeal the Militia
Clauses in the way that the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the
Eighteenth. With the Fourteenth Amendment's "majestic generali
ties,"215 however, its framers were seeking to consolidate the Union's
victory in the Civil War. The Amendment was drafted initially by the
congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction; the Committee's
mission was to set the terms on which the re-United States would go
forward.216 It is unthinkable that those who framed and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment expected the military balance of power be
tween the states and the federal government to revert to the status
quo ante bellum.
Let me now try to flesh out this reading of the Amendment using
the traditional tools of text, history and structure. The textual argu
ment takes as its point of departure the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; the argument is that by redefining citizen
ship as a national, rather than state, concept, the Amendment made
Americans subject to a federal draft. The argument from legislative
history is simply that the Republican Congress gave full consideration
to the constitutional arguments for and against a draft, and decided in
favor of the draft, in its debate over the Conscription Act itself. The
structural argument is that granting the federal government power to
conscript is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's partial re
pudiation of the Founders' state-centered federalism.

214. See MCPHERSON, supra note 174, at 854.
215. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947).
216. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 48-63 (1988).
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Text: Military Service as a Duty of "Citizens of the United States"

The Amendment's opening sentence declares: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside."217 The specific impetus for this provision, of course, was to
overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
which had held that African Americans were forever barred from U.S.
citizenship.218 But the impact of the change was far broader. As Justice
Field explained in the Slaughter-House Cases, decided shortly after
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment:
The first clause of this amendment determines who are citizens of the
United States, and how their citizenship is created. Before its enactment
there was much diversity of opinion among jurists and statesmen
whether there was any such citizenship independent of that of the State,
and, if any existed, as to the manner in which it originated. With a great
number the opinion prevailed that there was no such citizenship inde
pendent of the citizenship of the State . . . .
In the Dred Scott case this subject of citizenship was fully and elabo
rately discussed. The exposition in the opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis has
been generally accepted by the profession of the country as the one con
taining the soundest views of constitutional law. And he held that, under
the Constitution, citizenship of the United States in reference to natives
was dependent upon citizenship in the several States, under their consti
tutions and laws . . . .
The first clause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment changes this whole
subject, and removes it from the region of discussion and doubt. It rec
ognizes in express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the United
States, and it makes their citizenship dependent upon the place of their
birth, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution or laws
of any State or the condition of their ancestry. A citizen of a State is now
only a citizen of the United States residing in that State. The fundamen
tal rights, privileges and immunities which belong to him as a free man
and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the United States,
and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any State.219

As this excerpt indicates, the most obvious consequence of the new
constitutional category of "citizens of the United States" was to create
the possibility of "rights, privileges, and immunities" attendant to na
tional citizenship - and almost all of the jurisprudential debate about

217. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
218. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 73 (1872) (noting that the "main purpose" of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to "establish the citizenship of (former slaves and other free African
Americans]").
219. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 94-95.
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the Fourteenth Amendment, from Slaughter-House to Roe v. Wade220
to Saenz v. Roe,221 has concerned the scope of these rights. But citizen
ship has duties as well as rights, and central among these is the obliga
tion of military service - indeed, it is "one of the highest duties of the
citizen,"222 as the Court put it in Dred Scott itself. Prior to the Four
teenth Amendment, an American fulfilled this duty by serving in the
state militia. Ever since, the duty has run to the federal government as
well.
The constitutionality of the draft, then, can be linked directly to
the Fourteenth Amendment's revolution in the constitutional concept
of citizenship. In fact, a careful reading of the Court's opinion in the
Selective Draft Law Cases shows some evidence of this linkage. The
opinion, authored by Justice White, bases its holding primarily on the
Raise Armies Clause223 - as we have seen, this argument is unpersua
sive. White also, however, makes a secondary argument based on citi
zenship. In its brief, the United States had argued that: "The highest
duty of the citizen is to bear arms at the call of the nation. This duty is
inherent in citizenship. "224 This argument would have been considera
bly more difficult, if not impossible, to make before the Fourteenth
Amendment. But writing in 1 918, Justice White easily adopted the ar
gument. His opinion began by rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that a
draft is "repugnant to free government . . . . It may not be doubted
that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citi
zen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military
service in case of need and the right to compel it."225 White then pro
ceeded to examine the claim that only the states can draft soldiers. Af
ter reviewing the history of Civil War conscription, White wrote:
[W]e briefly direct attention to th[e Fourteenth] Amendment for the
purpose of pointing out, as has been frequently done in the past, how
completely it broadened the national scope of the Government under the
Constitution by causing citizenship of the United States to be paramount
and dominant instead of being subordinate and derivative, and therefore,
operating as it does upon all the powers conferred by the Constitution,
226
leaves no possible support for the contentions made
.

.

.

.

After writing most of the opinion as if it were 1789, White's final dis
missal of the militia-based argument against the draft rests on an
oblique but unmistakable suggestion that the military clauses of the
220. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
221. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
222. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 415.
223. See 245 U.S. 366, 377 (1918).
224. Id. at 368 (summarizing the government's brief).
225. Id. at 378.
226. Id. at 389 (citation omitted).
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original Constitution must be reinterpreted in light of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
2.

Legislative History: The Relationship Between the Conscription
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment

Now consider the Amendment's legislative history. I concede at
the outset that congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment
give no indication that it was expected to alter the Constitution's mili
tary structure. Yet if we look to elements of the legislative history be
yond these debates, the case for my reading grows stronger.
The most important element of this legislative history is the pas
sage of the Conscription Act itself, just a few years before adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.227 As we have seen, that Act provoked a
lengthy and sophisticated debate on the constitutionality of the draft.
This debate was conducted not only in the congressional chambers,
but also among the public. Needless to say, public interest in the pro
posal was intense. Yet despite the opponents' arguments, and after a
thorough airing of the issue, decisive majorities approved the bill.
Of course, the mere fact that congressional majorities believe a bill
is constitutional does not make it so. Rather, the relevance of the Con
scription Act debate lies in the fact that most of the Senators and Rep
resentatives who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment had voted for
the Conscription Act as well. For these men, and for the citizens who
stood behind them, the war had forced the conscription question upon
them; they had confronted the constitutional objections, and a deci
sion had been made.
To be clear, I am not claiming that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment consciously saw the Amendment as constitutionalizing
the Conscription Act - as they did, by contrast, with the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.228 With the latter, even those who voted for it felt the
need to dispel doubts about its legitimacy by constitutional amend
ment.229 With the Conscription Act, on the other hand, the few years
between its passage and the Fourteenth Amendment had more firmly
established the Act's legitimacy. After the initial difficulties imple
menting the draft, it had become a settled, if never popular, practice.
Thus while it would be imprecise to speak of a "framers' intent"
that the Fourteenth Amendment would authorize conscription, I do
227. The Conscription Act was enacted in 1863. The Fourteenth Amendment was ap
proved by Congress in 1866 and was ratified by 1868.
228. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 20 (stating that "all are agreed
[that] it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to embody and protect" the Civil
Rights Act of 1866).
229. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham);
NELSON, supra note 216, at 48.
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contend that the framers of the Amendment presumed federal
authority to conscript. Had Chief Justice Taney gotten the chance to
issue his draft opinion, we can suppose that the Fourteenth Amend
ment would have included language intended specifically to overturn
that ruling, just as it contained language designed to overturn Dred
Scott and to bolster the Civil Rights Act of 1866.230 Again, Justice
White's Selective Draft Law Cases opinion contains a subtle reference
to this history. The opinion gives an extended description of the Con
scription Act of 1863, concluding that "it was the efficient aid resulting
from the forces created by the draft at a very critical moment of the
civil strife which obviated a disaster which seemed impending and car
ried that struggle to a complete and successful conclusion."231 By 1918,
the Court was manifestly unwilling to undo the Civil War precedent.
Additional elements of legislative history confirm further that Re
construction Republicans held views of the army and the militia dia
metrically opposite those of the Founders. The Republicans saw the
national army as the savior of the Union, and the guarantor of freed
men's rights in the to-be-reconstructed South. In February 1867,
shortly after proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress reim
posed military rule on the southern states and required those states to
approve the Amendment as a condition of readmission to the Un
ion.232 Throughout the ratification period, then, a federal army com
posed partly of conscripted soldiers occupied the South.
The Republicans' view of the militia, meanwhile, is evident in two
key pieces of Reconstruction legislation: the Civil Rights Act of 1866233
and the Enforcement Act of 1871.234 The Reconstruction Congress
knew that the southern states would seek to oppress freed slaves not
only through the Black Codes and similar legislation (which the Four
teenth Amendment was designed to invalidate), but also by using ter
ror and brutality to enforce white supremacist social and political
practices.235 Thus the Civil Rights Act made it a federal crime for any
one acting "under color of any law" to violate the rights of freed
slaves, or to subject them to "punishment, pains, or penalties" other
than as a consequence of legal conviction.236 The Enforcement Act ex-

230. See supra notes 218, 228, 229, and accompanying text.
231 . The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 387 (1918).
232. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428; see also FONER, supra note 175, at 73-75.
233. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
234. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
235. Cf AMAR, supra note 9, at 166 (arguing that the use of "or enforce" in the Four
teenth Amendment shows intention to limit state executive action as well as legislative ac
tion ) .
236. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. at 27.
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tended these provisions by exposing rights violators to civil liability;237
this provision is the predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
These statutes were aimed directly at state law enforcement agents
and quasi-official entities such as the militia. As Carl Bogus has dem
onstrated, one of the militia's primary functions in the prewar South
was to enforce the Slave Codes.238 Reconstruction Republicans un
doubtedly anticipated that southern militias would continue to be
agents of racial oppression in the postwar period.239
Perhaps the clearest sign of the post-Civil War view of the militia
comes from the sections of the Enforcement Act aimed at the Ku Klux
Klan. In the decades following the Civil War, the Klan was the closest
thing to an "unorganized militia" in the United States. Yet no one
could confuse the Klan with the liberty-protecting citizen-soldiers of
the Founders' ideology. To the Reconstruction Republicans, certainly,
it was clear that the Klan's reign of terror threatened fundamental
constitutional (that is, Fourteenth Amendment) values. Accordingly,
the Enforcement Act broadened its focus beyond those acting "under
color of law." It also criminalized private conspiracies "for the pur
pose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or
immunities under the laws. "240
The Enforcement Act - so called because it was styled "An Act
to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti
tution of the United States"241 - nicely captures the changing consti
tutional status of the militia. To the Founders, the militia symbolized
freedom and liberty. To the Reconstruction Republicans, the term
"militia" connoted not just rebellion, but Klan violence and racial op
pression as well.
3.

Structure: The Demise of the Founders' Federalism

Finally, reading the Fourteenth Amendment to legitimize the draft
meshes perfectly with the broader structural principles underlying the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Republicans' reversal of the Founders'

237. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
238. See Bogus, Hidden History, supra note 3, at 335-37. Interestingly, though, historian
Peter Voelz has uncovered several instances during the colonial period in which South
Carolina actually armed slaves to fight as soldiers. See PETER M. VOELZ, SLAVE AND
SOLDIER: THE MILITARY IMPACT OF BLACKS IN THE COLONIAL AMERICAS 24-27 (1993).
239. See FONER, supra note 175, at 203 ("[S]tate militias [were] intended, as a
Mississippi white put it in 1865, to 'keep good order and discipline amongst the negro popu
lation.' ").
240. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2.
241. Id.
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preference for the militia over the army was part of their larger pro
gram for revamping the Founders' federalism.
The Founders' division of power between the national army and
the states' militias mirrored their overall allocation of power between
the federal government and the states. The guiding principle adopted
by the Philadelphia Convention was that the federal government's
authority should extend only to "cases to which the several states are
incompetent. "242 As Madison famously put it in the Federalist: "The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal gov
ernment are few and defined . . . . The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of af
fairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people . . . . "243
This allocation was rooted in a political theory that saw the federal
government as the main threat to liberty in the new structure. This was
obviously the view of the Anti-Federalists who wanted no central gov
ernment at all, or only a very limited one.244 But the Federalist sup
porters of the new Constitution also shared this perspective, albeit to a
lesser degree. To be sure, the Federalists did want to establish a cen
tral government. The states by themselves would be militarily weak,
inviting European hegemony;245 in the absence of federal coordination,
collective-action problems among the states could strangle com
merce;246 and in the worst case, the thirteen independent states would
fight bloody wars for domination of the continent.247
Yet these concerns did not reflect a mistrust of the state govern
ments themselves. The Founders feared a "disunited America,"248 but
as between the states and the new federal government, they plainly fa
vored the states. In the context of a federalist system, they were confi
dent that the "most natural attachment of the people will be to the
governments of their respective States."249 Many of the state govern
ments (in their colonial form) were more than one hundred years old,
and all had been around for several decades; the federal government
was new and untested. The state governments were already bound by
charters or constitutions, almost all of which had been rewritten since
the Revolution began.250 Most important, the size of the new nation
242. 2 FARRAND, supra note 48, at 229 (Virginia Plan as approved by Committee of the
Whole}.
243. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
244. See generally CORNELL, supra note 30.
245. See THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay).
246. See THE FEDERALIST No. 1 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
247. See THE FEDERALIST No. 5 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander
Hamilton).
248. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 42 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
249. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
250. See WOOD, supra note 1 10.
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deeply concerned many Founders, because of the "distance" it would
create between the government and the governed. This distance was
both geographical - unavoidably, federal representatives would be
several days' travel time from many of their constituents - and meta
phorical, in that the interests of many parts of the new country would
be quite distant from those of other parts.251
For all these reasons, the Founders saw the main threat to liberty
under the new Constitution as coming from the federal government,
not the states. Accordingly, the original Constitution left the power of
the states largely undisturbed.252 Not entirely - the Constitution did
expose state law to federal preemption,253 and it did impose a few di
rect limits on states.254 But the document's main restrictions, from the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the broad principles of
separation and enumeration of powers, applied only to the federal
government.
Indeed, not only were the Founders' untroubled by state power,
but they actively saw the states as bulwarks against federal over
reaching. In an age before modern political parties, the state govern
ments were ready-made political organizations, continually prepared
to challenge oppression by the federal government. Again, this vision
is elaborated by Madison in The Federalist No. 46:

251 . I acknowledge a strand of Federalist thought that distrusted the states even more
than the federal government. Most famously, Charles Beard showed that many Federalists
feared nascent populism in the post-Revolutionary state governments, and sought to protect
basic property rights. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); cf WOOD, supra note 1 10, at 475-83 (de
scribing Federalists' concern over "social mobility"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (conferring
authority over bankruptcy law on federal government); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (pro
hibiting states from "impairing the Obligation of Contracts").
More generally, Madison's Federalist No. 10
which today is probably the single best
known articulation of Federalist theory - argues the advantages of a "large over a small
republic." See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
"Extend the sphere," Madison counsels, and the new government will be able to "control[)
the effects of faction." Id. Read for all it's worth, Federalist No. 10 does indeed suggest that
the national government will be superior to the states on a whole range of issues, not merely
within its limited domain. But read this way, Federalist No. 10 is anomalous; there is no ques
tion that the Founders wanted the powers of the federal government to be "few and de
fined." THE FEDERALIST No. 45 at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Indeed, it may be that Federalist No. 10 is assigned so frequently in college political science
courses precisely because its strong nationalism is more in keeping with today's governmen
tal structure than that of the Founders. Moreover, as Larry Kramer has recently demon
strated, the evidence suggests that Madison's strong nationalist argument was either ignored
or misunderstood even by his fellow delegates at the Philadelphia convention. See Larry D.
Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999).
-

252. Of course, as a matter of political feasibility it would have been impossible in 1787
to fundamentally rearrange state institutions, even if the Philadelphia delegates had wanted
to do so.
253. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
254. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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[A]mbitious encroachments of the federal government on the authority
of the State governments would not excite the opposition of a single
State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm.
Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence
would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit
would animate and conduct the whole.255

· The ultimate act of "resistance," described by Madison in the passage
quoted earlier, would be for the states' militias to take up arms against
the federal army - a conflict, Madison assures his audience, in which
the states would surely prevail.256 Notice that in these passages
Madison unquestioningly assumes that the federal government would
be the wrongful aggressor, and the states the defenders of liberty. For
Madison and his generation, the militia were part and parcel of the
federalist structure of checks and balances.
The Reconstruction Republicans' view was wholly different. To
the men who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, it was
manifestly the states, not the federal government, that had perpetrated
the most horrible deprivations of liberty in the nation's history. The
Fourteenth Amendment engrafted this new perspective onto the Con
stitution. While the original Bill of Rights begins with the words
"Congress shall make no law," the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment began its key sentence with: "No State shall . . . . " No
longer would the states be free from constitutional restriction. This
language announced a decisive shift toward a constitutional regime
deeply skeptical of state power.
This skepticism certainly extended to the militia. In the Republi
cans' experience, state "resistance" to federal authority had been in
service of the evil of slavery, not in defense of freedom. Federalist No.
46 could not have been written in the aftermath of the Civil War. Or
rather, had the Republicans rewritten it, their purpose would have
been to assure their audience not that the state militia would be able to
fend off federal overreaching, but that in the Re-United States, the
federal government would be able to guarantee a bedrock minimum
of individual rights throughout the country.
In sum, then, the text, legislative history and structural implications
of the Fourteenth Amendment all support the holding of the Selective
Draft Law Cases. In 1815, a federal draft would have violated constitu
tional protections for state-based militia. By 1918, the draft was consti
tutional because the Fourteenth Amendment had tacitly repealed
those protections.257
255. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
256. See supra text accompanying note 63.
257. The 1990 case Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990), illustrates this tacit
repeal even more clearly than do the Selective Draft Law Cases. In Perpich, the Supreme
Court gave the federal government plenary authority over even the training of National
Guard units, despite the explicit constitutional reservation of this authority to the states. See
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TOWARD A THEORY OF THE MODERN SECOND AMENDMENT

The impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Second should
now be clear enough. Part I portrayed the Second Amendment as a
gloss on and reinforcement of the Militia Clauses of Article I; the
Amendment's purpose was to protect the Founders' allocation of
power between the federal army and the states' militia. Part III
showed how the Fourteenth Amendment condemned that allocation.
The inescapable conclusion is that the role of the Second Amendment
in the modem Constitution cannot be what it was in the original Con
stitution. The remaining task is to identify precisely what that role
should be. One possibility, of course, is no role at all. Perhaps the Sec
ond Amendment should, like the Militia Clauses, simply fade into
oblivion. Indeed, the opponents of Lincoln's Conscription Act pre
dicted just that outcome:
How can such a power [i.e., conscription] be reconciled with the provi
sions of the second article of the amendments to the Constitution, that "a
well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State?" You
render that article nugatory by such legislation, and yet it is one of the
amendments adopted by the First Congress . . . and unless it had been
well understood that this and other amendments restricting Federal
power would be adopted, it is very evident from the debates in the State
conventions that the Constitution would not have been ratified. This bill,
in effect, nullifies that second amendment, and abandons that "security
for a free State" which our fathers deemed essential.258

Modem doctrine comes quite near to making that prediction accu
rate. In today's world, in which the National Guard is part of the na
tional armed forces and states maintain no other organized militia, the
only practical effect of the courts' doctrine is to prohibit Congress
from disarming the National Guard. It seems unlikely in the extreme
that Congress will ever seek to do that. Contemporary doctrine re
duces the Second Amendment to a triviality, if not a nullity.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 ("reserving to the States respectively . . . the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress"). It is possible to
read Perpich as resting on the argument that federal funding for the Guard entitles the fed
eral government to insist on training authority, see 496 U.S. at 351 -52, but just as with the
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment, the Court's permission of conditional
spending that circumvents limits on federal authority is tantamount to abandonment of those
limits. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New
York, Printz and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 102-105 (demonstrating that permitting
Congress to coerce state action through conditional spending is identical to commandeering
state action in violation of the Tenth Amendment); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995) (describing and criticizing Supreme
Court's willingness to permit Congress to evade enumerated-powers limits on federal
authority with conditional spending); cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989) (describing doctrine under which federal government is
prohibited from evading certain constitutional restrictions through conditional spending).
258. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1365 (1863) (statement of Sen. Bayard).
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I do not think we need to go that far. The Second Amendment re
mains, after all, in the text of the Constitution. In showing modern
doctrine to be the product of changes in the Constitution since the
Founders' era, I do not mean to say that the Unorganized Militia Ap
proach is the only interpretively legitimate choice open to modern
courts. To the contrary, I do fault the courts for failing to undertake a
reconstruction of the Second Amendment that would accommodate
these changes. But I certainly do not fault them for refusing to read
the Amendment as guaranteeing the states access to an unorganized
militia, as the revisionists urge. That reading of the Amendment is
now foreclosed. In replacing the Founders' Unorganized Militia Ap
proach with the Organized Militia Approach, modem courts have at
least recognized that any interpretation of the Second Amendment
today must be faithful not only to the Founders' commitments but also
to the very different principles of national structure reflected in the
Civil War Amendments.
In this Part, I hope to lay the groundwork for a modern theory of
the Second Amendment. I begin by briefly reviewing the interpretive
methodology that underlies the account of the Second Amendment I
have laid out so far. Interpretation, I contend must be holistic, histori
cally sensitive and synthetic. Only this methodology gives us a satisfac
tory understanding of contemporary Second Amendment doctrine,
and any proposals for future doctrinal development must proceed
from the same methodology.
I will then consider a recent and powerful effort to apply this
methodology to the Second Amendment: Akhil Amar's argument that
the Fourteenth Amendment established a strong individual right to
gun ownership. In criticizing this argument, I uncover an additional in
terpretive constraint faced by a modern reader of the Second
Amendment. In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment, a contempo
rary interpreter of the Second Amendment must take account of the
mammoth changes in constitutional law effected during the New Deal
period. Professor Amar's reading of the Amendment, which follows
from his broader vision of the Bill of Rights, is unsatisfactory because
it fails to appreciate the roots of modern Bill of Rights doctrine in the
New Deal watershed.
A. The Need for Synthesis
I have tried thus far to dispel the "embarrassment" described by
Professor Levinson. For Levinson and the other revisionists, the vir
tual disappearance of the Second Amendment from modern constitu
tional jurisprudence is a mystery, but it turns out there is a rational
explanation after all. Modern courts' Organized Militia Approach is
perfectly consistent with a commitment to "original intent" as the
guiding principle of constitutional adjudication - as long, that is, as
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we have a suitably sophisticated methodology for interpreting and ap
plying "original intent."
First, interpretation must be holistic. The example of the revision
ists' Libertarian Approach shows the need for holism. That approach
fails because it is clause-bound; it tries to divine the meaning of "right
of the people to keep and bear Arms" as if the phrase could be di
vorced from its context among the Constitution's other military provi
sions.
Next, interpretation must be historically sensitive. One component
of historical sensitivity is suggested by Professor Lessig in his account
of interpretation-as-translation. The example of the revisionists' Un
organized Militia Approach shows the need for translation. That ap
proach fails because it wrongly assumes that maintaining doctrinal
consistency over time will automatically achieve fidelity to the Found
ers' intentions.
Yet, as we saw in Part II, "translation" has significant limitations.
Even the Henigan-Ehrman defense of the courts, which is holistic and
does attempt translation, still fails to justify modern Second Amend
ment doctrine as an act of fidelity to the Founders' intent. Now we can
see why: Henigan and Ehrman fail to appreciate how the Second
Amendment has been affected by the Fourteenth. To put the point
more generally: It is not enough to account for changes in factual
"presuppositions" that may affect our reading of a particular constitu
tional provision - we must also consider changes in other parts of the
Constitution that may revise or negate the substantive commitments
underlying that provision.
This follows directly from our commitment to holism. The task re
quired is not "translation" (or not just "translation") but rather (or
also) what Bruce Ackerman calls "synthesis": constructing a coherent
constitutional jurisprudence out of two or more fragmentary and in
consistent "original intents."259 In Lessig's terminology, some changes
in the context of a constitutional provision are not changes in "pre
suppositions," but changes in the text to be translated - or rather,
new chunks of text that must be synthesized with the original text to
create an intelligible new whole.
In the case of the Second Amendment, it is not enough to under
stand - or even to translate - what the Founders of 1787-1791
sought to accomplish. Nor is it sufficient alone to understand the aims
of the Reconstruction Republicans or their purposes in drafting the
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, keeping all these things in mind,
a judge must painstakingly assess which parts of the Founders' consti
tutional structure must be abandoned, or reconceived, in order to
maintain the integrity of the whole. Understanding the courts' treat259. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25, at 86-94.
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ment of the Second Amendment is impossible without appreciating
this synthetic dimension of contemporary doctrine.
B.

Why the Revisionists' Theory of Second Amendment
"Incorporation " is Incomplete

Of course, it is possible to accept the claim that interpretation must
be holistic, historical and synthetic, and still believe that modern
courts have gotten the Second Amendment all wrong. Akhil Amar has
recently put forward just this argument.260 Using the methodology I
advocate, Amar reaches conclusions precisely opposite those I have
drawn. For Amar, the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to
undercut the Second, but rather to reaffirm (or perhaps reframe and
extend) the constitutional commitment to the individual liberties pro
tected by the Bill of Rights - including the "right of the people to
keep and bear Arms." The result is a new strand of the revisionist ar
gument which grounds an individual right to bear arms on the Four
teenth Amendment rather than (or more precisely, in conjunction
with) the Second.
Amar's claims about the Second Amendment are part of his larger
argument about the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights. After all, the
problem of synthesizing the Second Amendment with the Fourteenth
is really a subset of a much larger question: What impact did the Four
teenth Amendment have on the Bill of Rights? And that question is
hardly a fresh one. It was the focus of one of the central doctrinal dis
putes in modern constitutional law: the debate over "incorporation" of
the Bill of Rights. In a series of opinions in the 1940s and 1950s,
Justice Black argued that "one of the chief objects that . . . [the Four
teenth Amendment was] intended to accomplish was to make the Bill
of Rights applicable, to the states."261 Justice Frankfurter, while
agreeing that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed significant restric
tions on state governments, rejected the notion that the Amendment
"was a covert way of imposing upon the States all the rules which it
seemed important to Eighteenth Century statesmen to write into the
Federal Amendments [i.e., the Bill of Rights]. . . . "262 Frankfurter in
stead argued that the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's protec
tions were defined by concepts of "natural law"263 and "canons of de
cency and fairness . . . "264
.

260. See AMAR, supra note 9, at 257-66; see also HALBROOK, supra note 1 1 1 .
261. Adamson v . California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1 947) (Black, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 63-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In the history of thought 'natural law' has a
much longer and much better founded meaning and justification than such subjective selec
tion of the first eight Amendments for incorporation into the Fourteenth.")
264. Id. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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This debate was resolved in the 1960s when the Court settled on a
doctrine of "selective incorporation."265 Under this approach, most of
the original Bill of Rights has been applied to the states as well as to
the federal government. Moreover, at the same time the Court "incor
porated" provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amend
ment, it also expanded the substantive scope of these rights. Whether
or not the process of incorporation caused these expansions, the two
developments at least appear correlated. Thus the natural assumption
of anyone who has the slightest familiarity with constitutional law will
be that if the Fourteenth Amendment has any impact on the Second
Amendment, it should be read to broaden, not narrow, the right to
"keep and bear Arms."
1.

The Incorporation Conundrum

As we have seen, however, the courts have not taken this view. In
the first place, the Second Amendment is one of the few Bill of Rights
provisions266 that has never been "incorporated." This fact has been
something of an embarrassment for the revisionists - if the right to
keep and bear arms is so fundamental, why has the Supreme Court
never applied it against the states? The revisionists sometimes try to
avoid this embarrassment by suggesting that the question of incorpo
ration is still open, because the Supreme Court cases expressly refus
ing to apply the Second Amendment to the states date from before the
inception of modern incorporation doctrine.267 But lower federal
courts have consistently held that the Second Amendment is not "in
corporated,"268 and the Supreme Court has twice in recent years de
clined to review this question.269
Of course, it may be that the courts are simply wrong, and that is
Amar's contention. Amar agrees with Black that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment sought to apply to the states at least some of
the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, but he offers penetrating
265. Or as I would put it, "selective incorporation plus" - for what the Court took away
by preferring selective incorporation to Frankfurter's "natural rights" approach, it gave back
with its "right to privacy" jurisprudence. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
266. The others are the Seventh Amendment and the grand jury provisions of the Fifth
Amendment (along with the "structural" provisions of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments and of course the all-but-obsolete Third Amendment).
267. See, e.g. , Kopel, supra note 3. The cases are Presser v. Illinois, 1 16 U.S. 252 (1886),
and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
268. See, e.g., Peoples Rights Org. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 538 n.18 (6th Cir.
1998); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270-71 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983).
269. Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (NJ. 1968), appeal dismissed 394 U.S. 812 (1969);
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983).
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critiques of both Black's "total incorporation" theory and the domi
nant "selective incorporation" doctrine. In their places, Amar presents
a theory of what he calls "refined incorporation." He distinguishes be
tween provisions protecting "a personal privilege - that is, a private
right - of individual citizens" (these merit incorporation) and provi
sions declaring "rights of states or the public at large" (these do
not).270 While acknowledging that the Second Amendment "marbled
together" both private and public rights, Amar contends that at least
some part of the right to bear arms is "private."271 He maintains that
this private aspect of the right - consisting chiefly of an individual's
right to own guns for the purpose of self-defense - was reaffirmed by
the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore merits incorporation.272
For most of the Bill of Rights, Amar's theory of "refined incorpo
ration" yields results that track the modem Court's case law fairly
closely. It is easy, then, to read Amar as providing a new rationale for
existing doctrine, and as arguing that the doctrinal changes he sug
gests, including incorporation of the Second Amendment, are man
dated by the fundamental principles of the doctrine itself.
In fact, Amar's justification for "refined incorporation" differs
radically from the rationale that underlies modern doctrine. Amar
may well be right that many among those who framed and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment believed that its Privileges and Immunities
Clause would apply the Bill of Rights to the states in something like
"refined incorporation." But that argument has never been accepted
by the Supreme Court. To accept it now - and to change Second
Amendment doctrine on that basis - would be to recant not just the
"selective incorporation" case law of the past several decades, but
fully 130 years of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. For the in
corporation cases of the 1940s and 1950s were the Court's second ef
fort at synthesizing the Fourteenth Amendment with the original Con
stitution and the Bill of Rights; the first was the series of cases,
culminating in Lochner v. New York, in which the Court defended
common law rights to property and contract against governmental in
fringement. The incorporation cases cannot be understood without
appreciating that they represented an effort not simply to integrate the
Fourteenth Amendment with the original Constitution, but to do so in
a way that avoided the substantive commitments of the by-then
repudiated Lochner decision.

270. AMAR, supra note 9, at 221.
271. Id. at 222.
272. Id. at 257-66. Note that Amar's new version of the revisionist argument not only
shifts the foundation of the right from the Second Amendment to the Fourteenth, but it also
restates the right as a libertarian one rather than a right derived from individuals' member
ship in an unorganized militia.
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The Road to Incorporation273

The long and winding road to incorporation began in 1873 with the
Slaughter-House Cases.214 Slaughter-House involved a Louisiana stat
ute that created a livestock-slaughtering monopoly in New Orleans.
The plaintiffs in Slaughter-House, competing butchers, challenged this
statute under all three of the Fourteenth Amendment's key substan
tive clauses, arguing that it deprived them of the privileges and immu
nities of plying their trade, that it deprived them of equal protection of
the law by unequally apportioning the license to slaughter, and that it
deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law.
As every first-year constitutional law student knows, Slaughter
House took an extremely narrow view of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Writing for the Court, Justice Miller concluded that the "one pervad
ing purpose" of the Amendment was "the freedom of the slave
race."275 The butchers' claims, having nothing to do with this purpose,
were easily dismissed.
Now, most first-year constitutional law students also learn that
Miller's narrow reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was
wrong, and terribly unfortunate (at least that's what I learned).276
Miller wrote for a bare five-to-four majority in Slaughter-House, and
the dissenters vigorously argued for a more sweeping view of the
Amendment, one which would protect "the natural and inalienable
rights which belong to all citizens."277 Amar sees the Court's eventual
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment as
a vindication of the dissenters' position.
In fact, however, there were two major - and importantly differ
ent - dissenting opinions in Slaughter-House. Amar focuses his dis
cussion mostly on Justice Bradley's dissent, which he reads as antici
pating modern incorporation doctrine. I quibble with this reading,278
273. The following account of the progression from Slaughter-House to Lochner bor
rows from David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1724-28
(1991).
274. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
275. Id. at 71.
276. It is standard for constitutional law scholars to bemoan the Slaughter-House Cases
- how much better it would have been if later individual rights jurisprudence (Roe,
Griswold, etc.) had been able to develop on the sturdy foundation of the Privileges and Im
munities Clause rather than the rickety Due Process Clause. See Kevin Christopher
Newsom, Setting lncorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation ofthe Slaughter-House Cases,
109 YALE L.J. 643, 647 & n.13 (2000) (listing scholarly works criticizing the Slaughter-House
Cases). The Court's recent decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), which hints at a
revival of the Privileges and Immunities doctrine, will only add fuel to this fire.
277. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
278. It is true that Bradley does list several Bill of Rights guarantees - "the right of
trial by jury, or free exercise of religious worship, the right of free speech and a free press,
the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures, the right to be secure
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but even if we see Bradley as a proto-incorporationist, the Court never
followed his lead. Rather, it was the other Slaughter-House dissent that of Justice Field - which the Court eventually elevated into doc
trine.
Like Bradley, Field saw the Miller interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment as far too narrow. But unlike Bradley, Field did not view
the Amendment as an invitation to formulate judicially-created fun
damental rights. Rather, the "privileges and immunities" he believed
the Amendment to protect were the liberties of property and contract
enjoyed under the common law.279 Thus, for Field the crucial fact in
the case was that the Louisiana slaughterhouse statute established a
monopoly, and that "monopolies in any known trade or manufac
ture . . . were held void at common law in the great Case of Monopo
lies. "280 Field elaborated his view in another case involving the same
Louisiana statute:
All grants of this kind are void at common law, because they destroy the
freedom of trade, discourage labor and industry, restrain persons from
getting an honest livelihood, and put it in the power of the grantees to
enhance the price of commodities. They are void because they interfere
with the liberty of the individual to pursue a lawful trade or employ
ment.281

In 1873, both Bradley and Field were too radical for a majority of
the Justices. To Miller, the dissenters threatened to "fetter and de
grade the State governments,"282 to federalize "the entire domain of
against unreasonable searches and seizures" - among those protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Id. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting). But Bradley's vision of the Four
teenth Amendment went well beyond mere incorporation of the Bill of Rights. He saw the
Amendment as protecting "privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamen
tal; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments." Id. at 117 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell). In elaborating the content of these fundamental
rights, Bradley looked to the Bill of Rights, but also to the Magna Carta and the "constitu
tional history of England." Id. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Indeed, for Bradley the exis
tence of these rights did not depend on the Constitution at all; he wrote that "even if the
Constitution were silent, the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens, as such,
would be no less real and no less inviolable than they now are." Id. at 1 19. The importance
of the Fourteenth Amendment was not that it specified the "privileges and immunities" of
citizens, but that it authorized the Supreme Court to order redress when those privileges and
immunities were violated. In Bradley's view, then, the only limits to the Court's new ability
to impose restrictions on state governments came from the Court's own understanding of
what rights were "fundamental" in Anglo-American tradition.

279. See Yassky, supra note 273, at 1726-28. Kevin Newsom has recently buttressed this
argument with valuable evidence showing that Field's repeated references to the Fourteenth
Amendment as protecting "common rights" expressed his view that the Amendment pro
tected common law rights to property and contract. See Newsom, supra note 276, at 658-63.
280. 83 U.S. at 101-02 (Field, J., dissenting) (citing Case of Monopolies, 11 Coke's Re
ports 85 (K.B. 1602) ).
281. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 755-56 (1884) (Field, J., concur
ring) (emphasis added).
282. 83 U.S. at 78.
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civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States."283 This was
simply too "great a departure from the structure and spirit of our insti
tutions. "284
But in time, the seeds planted by Field in Slaughter-House flow
ered. In the 1897 case A llgeyer v. Louisiana,285 the Court struck down
a Louisiana statute regulating sellers of insurance, establishing the
right to contract as a first-order constitutional guarantee. The Court's
opinion, authored by Justice Peckham, built its key holding on the
doctrinal foundation laid by Field:
The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth] [A]mendment means not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his
person . . . but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to
be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential
to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above men
tioned.286

The crucial qualifiers used by Peckham - "all lawful ways" and "any
lawful calling" - incorporated the Slaughter-House/Butchers' Union
premise that the common law defined the extent and nature of liber
ties protected by the Constitution from legislative interference.
Peckham's opinion ten years later in Lochner became the canonical
statement of this position. By according constitutional protection to
the common law right to sell labor, Lochner completed the reversal of
Slaughter-House and the vindication of Justice Field's dissent.287
I have argued elsewhere that Field's and Peckham's synthesis of
the Fourteenth Amendment with the original Constitution and the Bill
of Rights was - at the time - a commendable effort at constitutional
interpretation, deeply grounded in constitutional structure.288 For now,
let me make two quick points. First, there is some evidence that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to function as Field believed it should289 - al283. Id. at 77-78.
284. Id. at 78.
285. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
286. Id. at 589.
287. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
288. See Yassky, supra note 273, at 1721-24.
289. The argument, in short, is that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment main
tained a sharp distinction between civil rights (meaning the right to be treated as a person
for purposes of property ownership, contract formation and protection against torts) and
political rights (such as the right of free speech, the right to serve on a jury and the right to
serve in the militia), and they saw the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting, primarily if not
exclusively, the former. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 472, 476 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) (stating that purpose of Civil Rights Act, on which Fourteenth
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though I freely concede that the evidence marshalled by Amar in sup
port of the incorporationist interpretation is impressive.
Second, and more important for our purposes, it is inarguable that
in the decades following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court did in fact understand the Amendment's liberty protections
in the terms set forth in Lochner. During that period - the period
when the Court was closest to the work of John Bingham and the
other Reconstruction Republicans - the Court saw the Fourteenth
Amendment as incorporating not "the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights,"290 but rather common law rights to property and contrac
tual freedom.
That understanding persisted until the repudiation of Lochner in
the late 1930s. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish291 obliterated the doctrine
that individuals had substantive economic rights grounded in the Due
Process clause. In doing so, West Coast Hotel left a void: If the Four
teenth Amendment did not guarantee common law rights to property
and contract, then what did it accomplish? The Court's answer was to
reinvigorate the Bill of Rights and to apply its provisions to the states.
It is no accident that it was only after West Coast Hotel that the incor
poration debate exploded within the Court.292
Amendment was based, was to protect "the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue and
be sued, and to give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell, lease, hold and convey real and per
sonal property, and to full and equal benefit to all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property"); see also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977);
RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989).

290. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 83 (Black, J., dissenting).
291 . 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
292. The Court's decision in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897), is sometimes said to be the first incorporation decision. See, e.g. , Levinson,
supra note 3, at 653. That is a misreading of the case. The defendant in the case, the City of
Chicago, had condemned property belonging to the plaintiff railroad; the railroad alleged
that it had received insufficient compensation. The Court held that it would violate the Four
teenth Amendment if "private property is taken for the State . . . without compensation,"
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, 166 U.S. at 241, although it found no violation in
the case before it. The Court's declaration is sometimes thought to be an "incorporation" of
the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause, but the Court's opinion never mentions
the Fifth Amendment. Instead, the Court sees its holding as a straightforward application of
the Fourteenth Amendment's own Due Process Clause. If the case implies anything about
the Fifth Amendment, it is that the Just Compensation Clause is unnecessary, as the obliga
tion to provide compensation inheres in the due process requirement. Rather than an early
effort at incorporation, Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad should be seen as em
blematic of the property-centric Lochner era, as Justice Black suggested in his Adamson dis
sent, see 332 U.S. at 79-80.
It is true, however, that the Court began to apply the First Amendment against the states
several years prior to West Coast Hotel. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (invalidating state criminal syndicalism statute);
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating state statute authorizing
injunctions against defamatory newspapers); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) (striking down special tax on newspapers); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(overturning state conviction under anti-Communist censorship statutes). In these cases, the
Court moved from "assum[ing]" arguendo that "freedom of speech . . . [is] protected by the
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In effect, West Coast Hotel put before the Court the same question
it had originally faced in the Slaughter-House Cases: Given that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect certain basic rights
against invasion even by the states, precisely what are those rights?
The only difference was that this time the path taken by Justice Field
and the Lochner Court was foreclosed. West Coast Hotel thus chal
lenged the Court to develop a "due process" jurisprudence that not
only built on the foundation of the original Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, and not only incorporated the watershed changes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but also accommodated the newly-legitimate
activist state. The debate between Frankfurter's "natural law" ap
proach and Black's "total incorporation" approach was a response to
this challenge.293 In United States v. Carotene Products,294 one of the
early, crucial departures from Lochner, the Court gave a hint of what
was to come. Justice Stone's famous footnote four observed that the
Court's repudiation of constitutionalized economic rights did not
mean the end of meaningful judicial review; rather, Stone declared,
the Court would thenceforward be particularly careful to ensure com
pliance with the "specific prohibition[s] of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments. "295
The link between West Coast Hotel and the incorporation debate is
evident in Justice Black's most significant statement of his position, his
dissent in A damson v. California.296 Black saw clearly that the Field
Peckham approach to the Fourteenth Amendment had stood in the
way of the incorporationist approach he favored. Referring to a key
anti-incorporation decision, Twining v. New Jersey,297 Black wrote: "At
the same time that the Twining decision held that the states need not
conform to the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, it consolidated
the power that the Court had assumed under the due process clause by
laying even broader foundations for the Court to invalidate state and
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment'', Git/ow, 268 U.S. at 666, to declaring that
"[i]t is no longer open to doubt," Near, 283 U.S. at 707. The shift, however, was accompanied
by virtually no analysis. The Court's sustained inquiry into the incorporation question did
not occur until the 1940s. Accordingly, I read these cases as the sort of deviation from a
dominant paradigm that opens the way for a later shift in the paradigm - without which,
they would have remained anomalous and would likely have been narrowed or abandoned
by subsequent Courts. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1962).
293. This debate paralleled in many ways the debate between the Slaughter-House dis
senters - with Frankfurter articulating the modern version of Bradley's "natural law" ap
proach and Black arguing for doctrine constrained, not by the common law as in Field's
view, but by the text of the Bill of Rights.
294. 304 U.S.

144

(1938).

295. Id. at 1 52 n.4.
296. 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
297. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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even federal regulatory legislation [citing Lochner]."298 Black believed
the Field-Peckham approach was wrong even when decided - "Nei
ther the contraction of the Bill of Rights safeguards [i.e., the refusal to
incorporate] nor the invalidation of regulatory laws . . . would readily
be classified as the most satisfactory contribution of this Court to the
nation"299 - but for our purposes, the key point is that it was West
Coast Hotel that opened the door to modern incorporation doctrine.
With this skeletal history of incorporation, I want to suggest that
Amar jumps too hastily from his historical research into the Four
teenth Amendment to his doctrinal conclusions about incorporation.
Perhaps it is true that John Bingham, his colleagues in Congress and
the state ratifiers meant to "refine" the Bill of Rights as well as to ap
ply the refined Bill against the states. But even if so, it must be said
that from the period immediately following ratification of the Four
teenth Amendment until the 1940s, the Supreme Court rejected that
claim. And when the Court did begin in earnest to implement
Bingham's (putative) vision, it did so in response to yet another set of
massive changes in constitutional structure - namely, the New Deal
legitimation of an activist, bureaucratized, national government.
Amar's account of incorporation explains neither of these phenomena
- not the absence of incorporation doctrine before the New Deal, nor
its emergence after. Thus Amar's theory is far more radical than it
may first appear - it is not so much an explanation of the Court's Bill
of Rights doctrine as an effort to replace it.
For some, that observation will not be a fatal criticism - and
maybe not a criticism at all. Perhaps Amar's vision of the post
Fourteenth Amendment Bill of Rights is clearer than the Court's. I do
not want to take on so large a question here. My narrower focus is on
Amar's particular Second Amendment claim - the claim that the
Fourteenth Amendment not only applies the Second Amendment to
the states, but also somehow intensifies whatever "individual" right to
keep and bear arms was contained within the original Second
Amendment. My point is simply that Amar cannot support this claim
by arguing that the Second Amendment is an anomaly in contempo
rary constitutional law. Again, it is easy to read Amar as arguing that
the Supreme Court has basically gotten incorporation right, but that in
a few areas - notably the Second Amendment - it has gone astray.
If the Court has been "refining" the other Bill of Rights Amendments,
the argument would be, then it should do so with the Second as well.
This argument would be very appealing if Amar's overall theory of
"refined incorporation" matched the case law. But it does not. In
seeking to refine an "individual right" from the Second Amendment's
298. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 82.
299. Id. at 83.
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militia-focused ore, Amar is challenging the Court's view not only of
the Second Amendment, but of the entire Bill of Rights.
C.

Synthesizing the New Deal: The First and Second
Amendments Compared

Let me return, then, to other revisionists who do in fact make the
Second-Amendment-as-anomaly claim. It is a recurring theme in the
revisionist corpus that current doctrine treats the Second Amendment
so unlike other Bill of Rights provisions.300 Rights to free speech and
to freedom from unreasonable searches are recognized as fundamen
tal individual rights; they are zealously protected by the courts and
celebrated by scholars - so why does their textual neighbor, the right
to bear arms, get nothing but disrespect?
The revisionists' descriptive point is certainly well taken. There is
something singular about the neglect of the Second Amendment by
contemporary courts and scholars. There is a difference between the
courts' generous readings of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and their much more crabbed reading of the Second
Amendment.
But this observation has normative bite only if we believe the Sec
ond Amendment should be interpreted "comparably" to other Bill of
Rights Amendments. To the clause-bound originalist - and most re
visionists, with the obvious exception of Amar, fall into this camp this premise of comparability can be taken for granted. But our atten
tion to holism, change and synthesis tells us that amendments ratified
at the same time can be affected very differently by changes in consti
tutional structure since that time. And as we have just seen in our re
view of Akhil Amar's theory, the Court's interpretation of the Bill of
Rights has been affected not just by the Fourteenth Amendment, but
by the New Deal as well.
In this Section, then, I want to suggest that modern courts' dispa
rate treatment of the Second Amendment (compared to other Bill of
Rights provisions) is due to the impact of the New Deal - that syn
thesizing the New Deal into the Constitution yielded different results
for the Second Amendment than for other Bill of Rights provisions.
To defend this claim, I need to provide a full account of the inter
play among the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the
New Deal changes. I wish I could do so - indeed, I hope at another
time to be able to do so - but much of the work necessary to provide
such an account remains to be done. Let me start down the road, how
ever, by very briefly contrasting the development of the Second

300. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 3, at 657-58, Powe, Jr.,
note 3, at 1239-41.

supra

supra

note 3; Van Alstyne,

December 2000]

Second Amendment & Constitutional Change

661

Amendment with that of the First - in particular, that amendment's
guarantee of "freedom of speech."
Like the Second Amendment, the First shared the federalist
premises of the original Constitution. It aimed to keep the federal
government out of the business of censorship, while leaving the states
a free hand to regulate speech as they pleased. At one level this re
flected the Founders' general inclination to trust the states, rather than
the federal government, with sensitive matters (recall the debate in the
First Congress over Madison's proposed "conscientious objector" pro
vision301). Most important, as Madison described in Federalist No. 46,
both dissent by state government officials (protected under the First
Amendment) and the ultimate threat of resistance by state militias
(protected under the Second) would act as crucial checks on federal
overreaching.302
The parallels continued throughout the post-Civil War period, with
both the evisceration of the Constitution's military provisions and a
dramatic reduction in the scope of First Amendment protection, al
though these trends had different specific causes.
With the Second Amendment and the Militia Clauses, Lincoln's
nationalization of the military meant obsolescence. The decline of free
speech, by contrast, was a byproduct of the Supreme Court's Lochner
jurisprudence. The Court's reconceptualization of liberty rights in the
common law terms of property and contract left speech rights unpro
tected. The common law was not concerned with free speech - in
deed, the common law permitted prior restraints on publication and
libel suits based on criticism of public officials. Accordingly, speech
rights hit their nadir in the decades following the Civil War. Not only
did state governments continue actively to censor dissidents, but the
federal government got into the act as well, using seditious libel prose
cutions to imprison, if not to silence, critics of the government.303 At
the same time, as we have seen, the Court in the Selective Draft Law
Cases was putting its imprimatur on the death of the Founders' mili
tary system.
But here the comparison ends. Free speech rights exploded in the
1930s and 1940s. As the Supreme Court began to work through the
constitutional implications of the New Deal, it issued a series of lode301. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 63, 255, 256.
303. In 1919, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a federal judge's decision to sen
tence Eugene Debs to ten years in prison for giving a speech against American involvement
in World War I. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). While serving his sentence,
Debs received nearly one million votes as the Socialist Party candidate in the 1920 presiden
tial election. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 614 (41st ed. 1988). See also, e.g. , Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding state
conviction for "criminal syndicalism"); Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years,
90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981); Yassky, supra note 273, at 1717-20.
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star opinions establishing the basic framework of the robust free
speech regime that has persisted to this day: Lovell v. City of Griffin
(1938),304 Hague v. CIO (1939),305 West Virginia State Board of Educa
tion v. Barnette (1943),306 and Marsh v. A labama (1946).307 Over the
next few decades the Court would continue to elaborate this frame
work,308 and would dramatically expand the rights protected by the
Fourth,309 Fifth,310 Sixth311 and Eighth312 Amendments as well - thus
fulfilling the promise of Carolene Products.
Yet throughout all this, the Second Amendment has remained a
virtual nullity. The Supreme Court's lone major Second Amendment
case, United States v. Miller,31 3 was decided in 1939 - a year after
Carolene Products, and in the midst of the First Amendment's rebirth.
Miller involved a prosecution under the National Firearms Act of
1934.314 This statute, the first federal gun control law, regulated the
possession of machineguns and short-barreled shotguns by requiring
anyone possessing such a gun to obtain a license from the Treasury
Department. Because the licensing process was rigorous and license
applicants were required to pay a hefty fee, the effect was a near ban
on the private possession of these weapons. As we have seen, a com
parable statute enacted in 1800 would surely have been struck down,
but the Miller Court upheld the law, explicitly rejecting a Second
304. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution
of handbills without a permit).
305. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (enjoining municipality from prohibiting distribution of pam
phlets).
306. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (forbidding public schools to require students to recite pledge
of allegiance).
307. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (establishing right to distribute pamphlets on private property
in "company town"); see also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (over-t4rning state
conviction under anti-Communist censorship statutes); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down special tax on newspapers); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931) (invalidating state criminal syndicalism statute); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating state statute authorizing injunctions against defamatory
newspapers). On the timing of these opinions, see supra note 113; see also Yassky, supra
note 106.
308. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that subversive
advocacy is protected "except where [it] is directed to inciting or producing imminent law
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964) (establishing "actual malice" test for libel of public figure).
309. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
310. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
311. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
312. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
313. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
314. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236.
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Amendment challenge. There is some debate about the precise
meaning of Miller - I will say more about this debate below315 - but
at the very least, it is clear that the Miller Court avoided giving the
Second Amendment a broad construction similar to that of the First.
It is indisputable, moreover, that within a few years of Miller the lower
courts had fleshed out their Organized Militia Approach, 316 and that
the Supreme Court has since repeatedly declined to review that ap
proach.317
The mystery, then, is why the Court chose not to include the Sec
ond Amendment in its resurgent liberty jurisprudence. Without at
tempting to provide a full-blown explanation of the Court's synthesis
of the New Deal with pre-existing amendments, let me put forward a
working hypothesis: The Supreme Court of the late 1930s and 1940s
saw free speech rights as both ameliorating dangers of the new ad
ministrative state, while also being rooted in key New Deal themes;
accordingly, it revitalized the First Amendment. The Court could not,
however, envision a similar role for the right to bear arms.
The main innovation of the New Deal was that it greatly expanded
the power of government - and particularly of the federal govern
ment. In addition to overturning substantive due · process constraints
on economic regulation,318 the Court also eviscerated Commerce
Clause319 and separation of powers320 restraints on federal power. The

315. See infra Section IV.C.
316. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v. Tot, 131
F.2d 261 (3rd Cir. 1942).
317. See United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807
(1997); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Hickman v.
County of Los Angeles, 519 U.S. 912 (1996); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d
261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
318. Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state
minimum wage statute) with Moorehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936)
(invalidating state minimum wage statute under Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
319. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding production quotas of
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938), and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (up
holding wage and hour requirements of Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938), and Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding federal unemployment insurance system
of Social Security Act of 1935), with United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating
acreage reduction provisions of Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as beyond scope of
congressional power), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating Bi
tuminous Coal Conservation Act as exceeding Commerce Clause power), and Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating Child Labor Act as exceeding Commerce
Clause power).
320. Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding Na
tional Labor Relations Act of 1935), and Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), with
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating National
Industrial Recovery Act on separation of powers and Commerce Clause grounds).
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cumulative result was a government capable of speedy, sweeping ac
tion.
Critics, of course, saw in the new government order a grave threat
to individual liberty, and even many New Deal supporters shared this
concern, and both groups looked to the Court to set limits. The prob
lem for the Court was to devise limits that would not interfere with the
primary aims of the New Deal. The Court's solution was not to restrict
the substantive reach of the new administrative state, but to ensure its
democratic accountability. The Court saw that because the govern
ment could reorder citizens' lives so profoundly, the need for popular
control of the government was all the more important. Speech rights
were a prime constitutional mechanism for implementing this vision.
The Court's focus on protecting the mechanisms of democratic ac
countability also helped to resolve a tension within the New Deal's
ideological structure. On one hand, Roosevelt's changes were made in
the name of majoritarian government. On the other hand, the New
Dealers prized "nonpartisan experts" and "independent administra
tors." And indeed, many critics - and, again, even some friends - of
the New Deal believed that the new behemoth government agencies
threatened to slip the bonds of majoritarian control. While the Jus
tices' abrogation of the nondelegation doctrine exacerbated this
threat, their insistence that political debate remain uncorrupted by
government intervention served, in some measure, to alleviate it. Thus
by developing a robust, individual right to free speech, the Court ele
gantly blended constitutional values from the Founding, Reconstruc
tion and the New Deal.
The Second Amendment picture was quite different. While cen
sorship was no part of Roosevelt's agenda, gun control - as part of
crime control - was. The first of his "four freedoms" was "freedom of
speech and expression" - the last was "freedom from fear," to be
safeguarded by a powerful national government.321 Indeed, the Na
tional Firearms Act upheld in Miller was an important component of
the New Deal program, and was touted as such in Roosevelt's political
speeches.322 To be sure, the National Firearms Act was not nearly as
central to Roosevelt's program as his more well known economic
regulation initiatives, but the Act did fit comfortably within his new
paradigm of activist central government. To the Justices deciding
Miller in 1939, striking down the Act would have seemed like a return

321. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address Before Joint Session of Congress (Jan. 6,
1941), in NOTHING TO FEAR: THE SELECTED ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN DELANO
ROOSEVELT 1932-1945 at 258, 266 (B.D. Zevin ed. 1946).
322. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to the American People (June 28, 1954), in
NOTHING TO FEAR: THE SELECTED ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 19321945 supra note 321, at 34, 35; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address in Chicago, IL (Oct. 14, 1936)
in id. at 60, 64.
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to the ways of the Old Court. Elevating an individual property right in
firearms over the power of the government to promote public welfare
would have been wholly inconsistent with New Deal principles.
And if a reconceived (or as Amar would have it, "refined") indi
vidual right to own guns fit poorly with the Court's broader post-New
Deal jurisprudence, reviving the traditional understanding of the Sec
ond Amendment was equally implausible. With another Great War
looming, the Founders' preference for state militias over a national
army must have seemed quaint to say the least.
D. United States v. Miller and the Failure of the Courts
This is not to say, however, that it would have been impossible or that it is impossible today - for the Court to develop a jurispru
dence of the Second Amendment that respects the modem constitu
tional order. I am not at all sure that the Second Amendment law we
have now is the best Second Amendment law we can have, even
within interpretively legitimate bounds. Modern doctrine reduces the
Amendment to a virtual nullity - and a constitutional amendment is a
terrible thing to waste. We cannot, of course, revive the Amendment
by returning to the Founders' specific conception of decentralized
military structure with states playing an intermediary role. It is an
other question whether (or to what extent) the core values underlying
this structure remain viable. How difficult should it be for the Presi
dent to use military force? What mechanisms should the Court insist
upon - in the name of the Constitution - to ensure that warmaking
remains subject to democratic accountability?
Scholars have engaged these questions with some fascinating re
sults. Elaine Scarry, for example, has offered a brilliantly provocative
reading in which the Second Amendment prohibits the use of nuclear
weapons.323 David Williams suggests that taking the Second Amend
ment seriously might mean reviving the universal-service militia.324 Or
perhaps the Second Amendment should be read to require a draft reading the people's right to bear arms, in effect, as a nondelegable
duty.
The courts, however, and most important the Supreme Court, have
utterly failed to enter this discussion. We are nearly at the end of this
Article, and I have said very little about the Supreme Court's opinion
in Miller. The reason is that the opinion itself says very little. The de
fendant in the case, Jack Miller, had been prosecuted under the Na
tional Firearms Act for unlicensed possession of a short-barreled shot-

323. Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the
Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1991).
324. Williams, The Terrifying Second Amendment, supra note 3, at 607-10.

666

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:588

gun, and the Court rejected Miller's Second Amendment challenge to
the Act. The operative language in its opinion is this:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of
a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this
time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is
not within judicial notice that this weapon is part of the ordinary military
equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.325

Based on this passage, the revisionists read Miller as holding
merely that certain weapons are beyond the reach of Second Amend
ment protection. They contend that lower courts have illegitimately
constructed the Organized Militia Approach by taking Miller's lan
guage about "the preservation of efficiency of a well regulated militia"
out of context.326
There are problems with the revisionists' view of Miller. First, the
National Firearms Act regulated not only short-barreled shotguns but
also machineguns - which were standard-issue military equipment in
1939, as they are today. The Miller Court does not even mention that
fact. Yet if we read Miller as resting on the premise that short-barreled
shotguns are not "military equipment," the National Firearms Act's
regulation of machine guns is presumably unconstitutional. True,
judges are supposed to limit themselves to the case at hand, but it
seems odd that the Court would have upheld one part of a statute by
formulating a rule that immediately and obviously invalidates another
part of the very same statute without even alluding to the tension.
Second, the revisionist reading of Miller has the perverse result
that the deadlier a firearm is, the more likely it is to receive constitu
tional protection - because the military, of course, prefers weapons
that are as efficient and effective at killing as possible. Or as the First
Circuit put it in a case decided a few years after Miller: "Another ob
jection [to this reading of Miller] . . . is that according to it Congress
would be prevented by the Second Amendment from regulating the
possession or use by private persons . . . of distinctly military arms,
such as machine guns, trench mortars, anti-tank or anti-aircraft
guns . . . . "321
Moreover, the Miller opinion does plainly rule out the revisionists'
Libertarian Approach. If the Second Amendment is truly about a per325. 307 U.S. at 178 (quoting the statute).
326. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Inter
pretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961
(1996); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV.
1, 40-41 n.96 (1996); L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1311, 1332 (1997).
327. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942).
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sonal right to arm oneself, then the question whether there is any link
between the regulated weapon and militia service, the question at the
crux of Miller, is irrelevant. A sawed-off shotgun is quite useful for
self-defense - it is, in fact, a terrifying weapon - and under the Lib
ertarian Approach, denying access to such a weapon would certainly
infringe upon a protected Second Amendment interest.328
These are all good reasons to reject the revisionsts' reading of
Miller. But I believe the most important reason courts have read
Miller the way they have is because they sense the importance of the
changes in constitutional structure that I have tried to examine in this
Article. The Organized Militia Approach should be seen as an effort
to understand the "right to keep and bear Arms" in light of the Four
teenth Amendment's radical shift of power - including military
power - from the states to the federal government. The Founders de
signed the Constitution in the belief that state militias were preferable
to a federal army; after the Civil War, this belief could no longer serve
as a fundamental constitutional premise. By the time Miller reached
the Court, it had been twenty years since the Selective Draft Law
Cases approved a federal draft, confirming the repudiation of Article
I's protections for the militia. The purpose of the Second Amendment
had been to fortify the Militia Clauses; now that these provisions were
a dead letter, the Second Amendment was adrift.
But I concede, as I must, that neither Miller nor the lower court
opinions building on it give any hint of these historical and structural
concerns.329 This failure has significant costs. Not only has the oppor
tunity to develop meaningful Second Amendment doctrine gone un
realized, but the Amendment's role in public debate has become dis
torted. Over the past two years, for example, Congress has debated a
series of gun control measures advanced in the wake of the Columbine
tragedy. During the same period, Congress also considered a resolu
tion essentially reaffirming the War Powers Resolution, proposed in
the context of major commitments of U.S. military personnel in the
Middle East and in Bosnia.330 Senators and Representatives referred
repeatedly to the Second Amendment in opposing the gun control

328. For that matter, Miller is also inconsistent with the strong version of the "collective
rights" approach which turns the Second Amendment into a standing requirement. The
Court never questions Miller's standing to raise a Second Amendment claim; the fact that
his home state of Arkansas showed no interest in protecting Miller from imprisonment was
quite properly immaterial to the Court. See infra Section II.A.
329. Some revisionist scholars attribute the tentativeness of the Court's opinion in
Miller to the fact that the Court heard only from the government when the case was argued;
Miller himself was not represented, having jumped bail and fled. See, e.g., Dowlut, supra
note 3, at 73; Roy G. Weatherup, Standing A rmies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analy
sis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 999 (1975).

330. See 145 CONG. REC. H59, 2414 (daily ed. April 28, 1999) (debate in House of Rep
resentatives on resolution to withdraw troops from overseas).
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provisions;331 the Amendment was not mentioned once in reference to
the military.332
But while the courts' failure is costly, it should not seem surprising,
as the method of constitutional interpretation I am advocating is
sharply at variance with contemporary practice. Judges and lawyers,
just as much as the Second Amendment revisionists, are caught in the
trap of clause-bound, period-bound interpretation. Only by adopting a
textually holistic and historically sensitive methodology can we un
cover the reasons behind the disappearance of the Second Amend
ment and begin to think constructively about whether, and how, to re
vive it.

331. See 146 CONG. REC. E 1097 (daily ed. June 23, 2000) (statement of Rep. Weldon);
145 CONG. REC. E587, 1337 (daily ed. June 18, 1999) (statement of Rep. Barcia); 145 CONG.
REC. S74, 5633 (daily ed. May 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Smith); 145 CONG. REC. S59,
4319 (daily ed. April 28, 1999) (statement of Sen. McCain).
332. Based on a Lexis search of the Congressional Record for 1999 and 2000 (through
August 1), using the search terms [("war powers" or Bosnia or Yugoslavia or troops) and
"Second Amendment").

